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ARTICLES & ESSAYS
THE EQUILIBRIUM CONTENT OF CORPORATE
FEDERALISM
William W. Bratton* and Joseph A. McCahery**

INTRODUCTION
This is a time of spirited debate about the state-federal
allocation of corporate regulation. Arguments about the legitimacy
of charter competition and Delaware’s national role as a corporate
1
lawmaker are as intense as ever.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
simultaneously has triggered a loud discussion about the legitimacy
of federal intervention into corporate internal affairs traditionally
regulated by the states. We, however, see no cause for excitement
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
** Professor of Corporate Governance and Innovation, University of
Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, and Professor of
International Business Law, Tilburg University, Faculty of Law. The authors
would like to thank Michael Ingrassia and Elizabeth Glasgow for research
assistance. For comments, they thank participants at the 19th Annual
Business Law Symposium of the Wake Forest Law Review, the Conference on
the Means and Ends of Corporations held by the UCLA-Sloan Research
Program on Business Organizations, the Washington University Law School
Faculty Colloquium, and law and economics workshops at UC Berkeley and
Georgetown Law Schools.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2002)).
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on either front. Despite recent evidence of infirmities in the charter
market, we think Delaware legitimately plays a national role. At
the same time, we see no support for the view that recent federal
expansion into internal affairs territory destabilizes or impairs
corporate law’s federal structure.
This Article explains why corporate federalism remains robust,
offering a positive political economy. Drawing on the history of
corporate law and basic concepts of evolutionary game theory, we
locate the content of corporate federalism in two stable equilibriums.
The first equilibrium prevails in the charter market, following from
Delaware’s successful pursuit of an evolutionarily stable strategy to
maximize rents from the sale of charters. The strategy, first
followed by New Jersey, caused a radical change in corporate law in
the late nineteenth century. Since then, stability has ruled.
Corporate law’s basic, enabling outline changed little during the
twentieth century. Operative incentives, market structure, and
regulatory results have been more constant than dynamic, even as
Delaware often has adjusted its strategy as it has adapted to events.
The second equilibrium is more political than economic and
prevails among the makers of national corporate law—Congress, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the stock exchanges, and the
federal courts. These actors react to events in a more volatile
manner. But even here equilibrium has prevailed since 1934. In
theory, under the prevailing norm, national regulation covers the
securities markets and mandates transparency respecting firms
with publicly traded securities, while internal corporate affairs are
left to the states. In practice, federal lawmakers sometimes
disregard the norm, entering into internal affairs as the national
system grows episodically. But they follow a norm of cooperation
even as they make these incursions. Federal regulators never
structure interventions so as to disrupt the state equilibrium. They
leave Delaware in place, along with its stable strategy and its rents.
In our view, this is the core of federalism, a view that contrasts with
a prevailing subject matter-based conception.
The cooperative federal strategy gradually evolved toward
stability after 1934. Federal regulatory restraint was politically
contested for much of the twentieth century, as progressives
objected to rent-driven lawmaking in the states and proposed
preemption of the entire field. But the public interest approach
steadily lost political salience. On the other side, beginning in the
latter part of the century, free market proponents made a case
against any national corporate law, in effect proposing an
irrebuttable presumption favoring state regulation of internal
affairs. That case also has lacked political salience. The actors who
make corporate law have resisted the influence of both ideological
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paradigms, instead regulating by reference to a governance agenda.
This is a set of regulatory strategies, mostly process-based, directed
to the amelioration of agency costs in publicly traded, managementdominated firms. Discussions of agenda items tend to devolve on
functional questions about performance and welfare effects.
Ideological lines tend to be drawn only when questions arise as to
the relative costs and benefits of self-regulation and process
mandates. Since answers tend to be cautious, they by default favor
state autonomy. At the same time, the internal affairs presumption
yields quickly whenever a national political imperative presents
itself.
In the evolving pattern, the federal system mandates while
Delaware consistently favors self-regulation.
The federal
government is the bad cop. Its mission is to make sure that firms
tell the truth about themselves. It performs the mission with a
massive, mandatory apparatus peopled by prosecutors with political
aspirations and greedy plaintiffs’ lawyers, imposing fines and
large money judgments and occasionally sending miscreants to jail.
Delaware is the good cop. It arbitrates between shareholder and
management interests, making sure never to chill risk taking. It
articulates governance standards in a dialogue with the actors it
regulates. It only polices when forced. Even then it chooses its
techniques with care, sometimes enjoining a transaction but almost
never imposing a money judgment. Its mandarin corporate case law
is conversant with financial technicalities and full of procedural
nuance.
The good cop/bad cop routine follows from the federal structure.
Delaware’s sales of domiciles to firms operating nationwide can
implicate externalities. Externalities do occur because Delaware’s
strategy structurally favors management on allocational questions.
It follows that a state with Delaware’s incentives would not be
tolerated as a de facto national lawmaker absent the possibility of
federal preemption to reverse or modify state law results. At the
same time, when financial crises and compliance breakdowns
2
coincide, national lawmakers worry about the reactions of the
median voter. There result national political demands concerning
the conduct of corporate business. Delaware is disabled from
responding to such demands, self-regulation and kid glove
treatment being essential components of its evolutionarily stable
strategy. Charter competition embeds enabling state corporate law

2. Price declines have been triggering governmental regulation of the
securities markets for 300 years. See STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN
SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS 1690-1860 41 (1998).
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and inhibits policing. By default, then, the job of confronting
external shocks goes to actors at the national level. This leaves
Delaware structurally vulnerable to shifting preferences and abrupt
changes in response at the federal level.
But federal responses have, over time, become progressively less
threatening to the state equilibrium. Federal elected officials tend
to traverse internal affairs on the upside to satisfy interest group
demands, expecting no adverse political consequences. On the
downside, officials legislate in response to more broadly based
political demands, acting to avoid finding themselves on the wrong
side of median voter preferences, rather than acting at the behest of
the interest groups. Meanwhile, median voter demands have moved
away from early- and mid-twentieth century populist concerns like
corporate bigness and labor relations.
Now, in the era of
shareholder capitalism, national political demands tend to be driven
by shareholder value. Today’s populist agenda concerns compliance
with laws designed to assure accurate market prices.
These downside legislative packages are designed to correct
policy imbalances in the voters’ eyes and avoid any fundamental
restructuring of corporate law. This makes political sense in light of
Delaware’s emergence in the good cop role. Just as the good cop’s
role is untenable without a bad cop in the other room, so does the
bad cop make use of the good cop. As the good cop, Delaware figures
in the wider politics of shareholder value.
It follows that
interference with the state equilibrium implies more than just
interest group opposition; it also holds out political risks with the
median voter.
Where national corporate law is driven by valuations in
securities markets, state corporate law is driven by rents. Many
take this point as a basis for questioning the system, persuasively
showing that the state equilibrium does not measure up as first-best
when analogized to an efficient product market. While we agree
with the second-best description of the charter market, we do not see
any negative implications for Delaware’s legitimacy, in theory or in
practice.
For us, it suffices that the system is consensual,
responsive, and monitored at the national level. Indeed, it is not
clear to us that a first-best market for law could exist in the first
place. Law rarely works as product in the real world because
lawmakers lack entrepreneurial incentives.
It accordingly is
unsurprising to find a jackpot of rents in the financial profile of a
state that not only turns itself into an entrepreneurial shop, but also
successfully pursues the same business plan for a century.
Summing up, this Article brings five points to corporate
federalism discussions. First, federal intervention into internal
affairs is inevitable because Delaware follows an evolutionarily
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stable strategy that constrains its ability to respond to shocks that
create national political demands. Second, national interventions
are structured so as to leave the rent-driven state equilibrium
undisturbed. Third, the cooperative federal strategy has come to
respond to political demands focused on shareholder value. Fourth,
the state equilibrium’s second-best quality has no bearing on
corporate federalism. From all of this follows a fifth point—the
threat of federal intervention has sunk into the deep constitutional
structure, leaving Delaware safe in the present context.
Part I recounts the evolution of state corporate codes from the
appearance of charter competition in New Jersey in 1888 through
the takeover wars of the 1980s. This account shows that an
enabling approach quickly became embedded in corporate law due to
the appearance of a stable strategy for charter market success. The
discussion goes on to describe the opposing evaluative models drawn
on by the charter system’s opponents and proponents—the trust
3
paradigm of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (and successors) and
4
the market paradigm of Henry Manne and Michael Jensen (and
successors). Finally, Part I takes up the question of whether the
charter market’s second-best properties make any difference for
federalism and the internal affairs norm, concluding that they do
not matter.
Part II turns to national law, setting out a political economy of
federal incursions on corporate internal affairs since 1934. This
begins with two prominent initiatives that failed, federal chartering
and federal protection of hostile takeovers, and shows how both the
trust and market paradigms both fell short as political motivators.
Discussion turns to incursions that succeeded, mostly prominently
5
6
the Williams Act, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the
7
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. These histories show that where the state
system is embedded, federal corporate lawmaking is politically
contingent and responsive to events. Even so, federal regulators
respond to events in predictable ways, hewing to the governance
agenda, the shareholder value enhancement objective, and a
3. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1991).
4. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 310 (1976).
5. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2000)).
6. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
13(b)(2), 30A, 32, 78m(b)(2), 78dd-1-2, 78ff (2000)).
7. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2002)).
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cooperative pattern of respect for the stable state equilibrium.
Part III focuses on state responses to developments in the
national political economy, looking at Delaware’s evolution since the
mid-1970s.
Delaware, under national pressure, adjusted its
strategy to make itself a more credible source of corporate fiduciary
law. It learned how to draw on the governance agenda to build self
regulation into fiduciary enforcement. It emerged in the role of
national good cop, the important point being that it found a way to
police without defecting from its equilibrium strategy. Delaware
also held to its strategy on the focal point issue of antitakeover
protection in the teeth of federal pressure. Today, with takeovers off
of the federal political agenda and newly empowered shareholders
taking up governance slack, Delaware looks to be in better shape
than ever.
Part IV concludes.
I.

POLITICAL ECONOMY AT THE STATE LEVEL

National regulators—Congress, the Securities Exchange
Commission, the stock exchanges, and the federal courts—have
8
generated a long list of disclosure and governance mandates that
expand on the state corporate law system, imposing additional
duties on corporate managers and according shareholders additional
rights. These national regulations tend to supplement the state
9
system, rarely displacing it altogether. The pattern of restraint
does not follow from a constitutional mandate—Congress could draw
10
on the same Commerce Clause on which it draws in supplementing
the state system to occupy the entire field of corporate law. The
restraint instead follows from an informal norm of federalism,
termed “internal affairs.”
This abstracts from the post-1934
regulatory pattern to hold that federal law appropriately addresses
trading markets, adding disclosure, antifraud, and insider trading
mandates. All other corporate subject matters concern “internal

8. The disclosure mandates significantly impact day-to-day conduct of
business, despite their formal denomination as market regulation.
Commentators point out that enforcement proceedings implicate complex fact
questions about the business and management decisions, subjecting ordinary
operations to regulatory review. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale,
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56
VAND. L. REV. 859, 895-901 (2003). They in effect substitute for the minimalist
state law duty of care. Id. at 903-09; see also Joel Seligman, The New Corporate
Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993).
9. For a discussion of the points of preemption, see Robert B. Thompson,
Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder
Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (1999).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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affairs” and presumptively are left to the states. At the national
level we have markets and mandates, and at the state level, internal
affairs, free contract, enabling governance strategies, and ex post
fiduciary review.
The internal affairs norm is fragile, both descriptively and
normatively. Even as it influences the national regulatory agenda
11
at some level and federal regulators habitually restrain their
entries into state territory, the norm has not contained the federal
agenda in a formal sense. With the proxy rules, for example, the
federal securities law shifts from regulation of market transactions
to regulation of shareholders meetings, going deep into internal
governance territory. National market regulators also traverse the
states’ enabling internal regime as they seek to assure the quality of
financial reports, imposing compliance systems and committee
requirements. As the list of such interventions lengthens, a subject
matter-based description less and less describes the content of
corporate federalism.
Corporate law’s complex, overlapping pattern results from more
than a century of political and economic interaction among actors in
large firms, in the securities markets, and in state and federal
governments. As a descriptive matter, it follows that federalism’s
content can be accessed fully only if the static picture is recast in the
historical, political, and economic framework that created it. Such a
dynamic description will help us address corporate federalism’s
central issue—the weight to be accorded state control of internal
affairs in national corporate regulation. Two questions state the
issue more specifically. The first is descriptive: whether the internal
affairs norm in fact operates as a presumption that constrains
national-level lawmakers. The second is normative: whether, to the
extent the internal affairs norm does constrain at the national level,
it follows from a reflexive subsidiarity and lacks policy content or, in
the alternative, possesses welfare-enhancing properties. To address
these questions, this Article undertakes a comparative political
economy of corporate lawmaking. This Part evaluates lawmaking in
the states.
At the state level, charter competition determines corporate law
regulatory strategies. The question concerning the appropriate
strength of the federal internal affairs presumption accordingly
tends to overlap the question concerning charter competition’s
welfare effects.
The discussion that follows enters onto this
contested territory with a descriptive agenda. The description leads
us to depict the states as noncooperative players of a rent-driven
game and Delaware as the follower of a successful, evolutionarily
11. See infra text accompanying notes 190-96.
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stable strategy. Corporate law emerges in a stable equilibrium
state. The description, in turn, implies a favorable normative
evaluation.
Part I.A traces the evolution of the state system, identifying its
principal political and economic determinants. This is a history of
regulatory responsiveness induced by rents paid by management.
The funding removes state corporate law from the ordinary
influences that shape democratic government and embed state-level
governance strategies, which show a notable constancy over time. It
also structurally removes corporate law from the ordinary political
conditions that shape regulation, whether at the state or national
level. Externalities emerge as a distinct possibility. It follows that,
absent the possibility of federal intervention at the behest of actors
disadvantaged by the state system but not represented in the
chartering state, state-level charter competition would be
intolerable in a federal system.
Part I.B looks at theories that evaluate charter competition.
First comes the trust paradigm of Berle and Means, and Cary, and
its race to the bottom description. Next comes the market paradigm
of the late twentieth century and its race to the top description. We
show that each paradigm was directed as much against the
competing paradigm as either was directed toward accurate
description of the state system and its political economy.
Contemporary descriptions correct the shortcoming, showing that
the charter market is uncompetitive and riddled with economic
distortions. We do not dispute the accuracy of these descriptions.
But we do question whether they have any significant implications
for the internal affairs norm. In our analysis, the presumption
leaving internal affairs with the states emerges unscathed even as
economic analysis places the charter market deeper and deeper in
second-best territory.
A.

The Competitive Era
1.

New Jersey and Delaware

In 1888 the government of New Jersey needed new sources of
revenue. James Brooks Dill, a New York lawyer, suggested to the
state’s politicians that significant sums could be raised if the state
provided an attractive domicile for the nation’s growing corporate
12
population. The politicians countered that West Virginia already
had tried this, liberalizing its corporate code, but without significant

12. Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 18751929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 680-81 (1989).
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13

fiscal results. Indeed, in 1888, West Virginia’s Secretary of State
was stationed at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York, the seal of the
state in hand, ready to sell charters. He found takers, but not in
14
overwhelming numbers. Dill assured the politicians that it would
15
be different with New Jersey. The state would not only draft a
more liberal code, it would market the code more successfully.
Toward the latter end, Dill organized the Corporation Trust
Company, which would both serve as the state’s marketing arm and
as a local agent for incorporating firms, providing them a physical
16
office within the state. Dill, who made sure to put New Jersey’s
Governor and Secretary of State on the Corporation Trust board of
17
directors, got his corporate code.
The regulatory strategy was enabling. By 1896, all significant
ex ante constraints on corporate agents had been stripped from New
Jersey’s code. Governance processes took their place. Corporations
were left free to change their business, alter their equity capital
18
structures, and amend their charters. More importantly, the code
19
left them free to merge and combine in holding company structures
toward the end of facilitating anticompetitive arrangements. New
20
Jersey thus opened the door for merger even as other states were

13. Harold W. Stoke, Economic Influences upon Corporation Laws of New
Jersey, 38 J. POL. ECON. 551, 571 (1930).
14. Lawrence Mitchell, Squeezing Truth From Power: The Growth of
American Corporate Capitalism: 1899-1919 ch. 2, 15-16 (Aug. 2006)
(unpublished book manuscript, on file with author).
15. Stoke, supra note 13, at 571.
16. Id.
17. Stoke, supra note 13, at 570-71, 573. The strategy relies on federal
constitutional law, under which corporations are treated as “persons” entitled to
the Constitution’s protection. Under a nineteenth-century judicial doctrine
termed “unconstitutional conditions” it was held to that a state could not
exclude corporations incorporated elsewhere.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 47-48 (1991). Under a common law
conflict of laws rule that evolved during the twentieth century, the states
respect the chartering states’ governance of corporate internal affairs. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
18. Stoke, supra note 13, at 572-73.
19. The removal of agent constraints facilitated mergers. The removal of
legal capital constraints made stock watering legal, which made it possible for a
large corporation to buy up competitors by offering stock consideration at
bargain prices. In addition, the code permitted different classes of stock to have
different economic and voting rights, facilitating deal-making by making it
possible to pay with nonvoting or low-voting shares. RALPH NADER ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL
CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 45 (1976).
20. See Brian R. Cheffins, Investor Sentiment and Antitrust Law as
Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure: The Great Merger Wave of

628

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

following the federal government and enacting antitrust laws
21
modeled on the Sherman Act.
New Jersey’s code also held out a critical innovation respecting
governance process: for the first time in any state code, initiation
rights were vested in the board of directors subject to shareholder
22
ratification. This gave managers agenda control over fundamental
changes, including, critically, reincorporation to another state.
(Previously, an agency theory of board authority had prevailed and
23
shareholder initiative had been the rule.)
There was also an
innovative governance mandate: all shareholders’ meetings had to
be held in New Jersey, providing not only rents for the state but also
assuring that voting would be by proxy, making challenges less
24
likely.
25
New Jersey’s 1896 code became the template for the evolution
26
of the state-level corporate regime. Subsequent departures from it
have opened new stretches of enabling territory but have not
changed the system fundamentally. The New Jersey code became
the template because it succeeded competitively. Half of the
nation’s largest corporations were domiciled in New Jersey by
27
1899. The state’s deficit was wiped out. By 1905, its governor even
boasted that none of the state’s income was contributed by direct

1897 to 1903, 21-25 (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper, 2002),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=348480 (describing the mergers and
showing that this period of acquisition activity amounted to a catalyst for
diffuse equity ownership).
21. By 1914 all but New Jersey and six other states had done so. Stoke,
supra note 13, at 575. See also HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 266-67.
22. JAMES B. DILL, THE STATUTORY AND CASE LAW APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE
COMPANIES UNDER THE GENERAL CORPORATION ACT OF NEW JERSEY 42-43 (1898)
(New Jersey General Corporation Act § 27).
23. See JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE §§ 297-99 (10th ed. 1875); 1 VICTOR
MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 243-44 (2d ed.
1886). Delaware followed in its corporations code of 1899. See Section 135 of
the Act of 1899, 21 Del. Laws 501 (1899); RUSSELL CARPENTER LARCOM, THE
DELAWARE CORPORATION 11-13 (1937). These agenda control provisions diffused
into the codes of other states during the subsequent decades. By 1960, twentyfive state codes conditioned charter amendment on board approval. See 2
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 54 ¶ 6 (1960). By 1970, twenty-eight state codes
did so. See 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 59 ¶ 6 (1971).
24. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 46.
25. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Facilitative and Mandatory Rules in the
Corporation Law(s) of the United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 249 (2002)
(noting that state codes have been facilitative since the New Jersey innovation).
26. New Jersey’s code in 1929 resembled “very much the laws of 1896.”
Stoke, supra note 13, at 579.
27. Id. at 574.
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28

payments from individuals.
Other states entered the new charter market.
In 1899,
Delaware’s Josiah A. Marvel marked up his state’s corporate code to
29
mimic New Jersey’s. (He also formed the Corporations Services
30
Company and mailed advertisements.) Marvel’s code offered fewer
restrictions on the issuance of stock and lower franchise fees. It also
carried the contractarian model to its logical conclusion by providing
31
that the charter could contain any provisions not contrary to law.
Delaware attracted a handful of large firms but did not threaten
32
New Jersey’s dominance.
Even so, corporate revenues quickly
constituted an important source of Delaware’s revenues, rising from
33
7% of total revenues in 1899 to 20.5% in 1900 and 30.6% in 1906.
West Virginia, Maryland, and Maine quickly followed with revisions
34
of their own codes. Other states soon fell into line. By 1912, the
laws of most of the states had been revised in varying degrees to
35
follow the enabling strategy.
New Jersey backtracked on February 17, 1913, enacting a series
36
of antitrust amendments called the “Seven Sisters.”
These
variously prohibited monopolization, price fixing, and other
anticompetitive behavior, following an agenda set by Governor
37
Woodrow Wilson, who was about to be inaugurated president. The
number of charters issued in New Jersey declined in succeeding
38
years. The state’s lawmakers then had second thoughts, removing
39
the salient prohibitions from the corporate code in 1915 and 1917.
Chartering firms neither forgave nor forgot New Jersey’s
28. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 48.
29. Id. at 51-52.
30. See Note, Little Delaware Makes a Bid for the Organization of Trusts,
39 AM. L. REV. 418, 419 (1899).
31. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business
Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 27 (1936).
32. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 503-05 tbl.5.
33. Id. at 535 tbl.2. The percentage figure was volatile, however. In 1908
the percentage of revenues from chartering fell to 15.7%. Id.
34. Stoke, supra note 13, at 575-76.
35. See NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 50 (noting that forty-two states
permitted organization for any lawful purpose; forty-three had lifted limits on
capitalization; twenty-four permitted perpetual existence; eighteen permitted
mergers; and forty permitted stock to be issued for noncash consideration, nine
of which made the judgment of the board respecting the value of the
consideration conclusive absent fraud). Even New York proved capable of
innovation in the removal of agent constraints by becoming the first state to
permit no-par stock in 1912. Dodd, Jr., supra note 31, at 44 n.68.
36. Stoke, supra note 13, at 578.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 574 n.74, 579.
39. Id. at 579.
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defection to the antitrust side. Delaware saw a significant increase
in large firm incorporations and reincorporations, numbers that
40
would peak during the boom years of the 1920s. By 1917, 36.4% of
41
Delaware’s revenues came from chartering.
(The percentage
42
peaked at 42.5% in 1929.) By 1922, Delaware had a clear lead,
emerging as the state of incorporation of 55% of the firms listed on
43
the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).
State corporate law emerged fully formed by the boom years of
the 1920s. Then, as now, the terms of affiliation of corporate agents
were left to be arranged through contract. Then, as now, the law
imposed no significant protections for creditors or other
constituents. Then, as now, ex post fiduciary law provided the
principal constraint. Then, as now, ultimate shareholder control
had to be achieved through the exercise of governance mechanisms,
the board of directors held agenda control, and the proxy voting
44
system operated as a barrier to soundings of shareholder voice.
State law emerged in this mature form in a hotly competitive
environment, with two states (New Jersey and Delaware) enjoying
the lead in succession and others affirmatively vying for business.
Competing state actors were highly incentivized, between the twin
payoffs of a significant positive impact on state revenues and private
rents for key state actors from stakes in service companies.
Two additional points should be noted about the early period.
Charter competition was invented by a New York corporate lawyer
and from the very beginning was fully compatible with the interests
45
of New York’s corporate bar. Transactions involving New Jersey
and Delaware corporations closed in New York, stage managed by
New York lawyers, without any fee sharing with New Jersey or
Delaware lawyers. From the beginning, lawyers in financial centers
opined on due organization under New Jersey and Delaware law,
ignoring the usual formal requisite of membership in the bar of the
46
state law applied in the opinion.
Delaware’s famously well-

40. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 503-05 tbl.5.
41. Id. at 535 tbl.2.
42. Id. at 536 tbl.2.
43. LARCOM, supra note 23, at 174.
44. For a summary of the operation of the state codes, see Dodd, Jr., supra
note 31, at 51.
45. NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 50-52, 54 (1976).
46. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Real
Property Law, Subcommittee on Mortgage Loan Opinions & the New York
State Bar Association, Real Property Law Section, Attorney Opinion Letters
Committee, Mortgage Loan Opinion Report, 54 BUS. L. 119, 140 (1998)
(explaining that New York lawyers give Delaware law opinions); see also
Committee on Corporations, 1989 Report of the Committee on Corporations of
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compensated bar conducts a litigation practice.
Secondly, the states competed for charters and created enabling
codes against a constant threat of federal intervention. Bills
proposing federal incorporation of large firms, modeled on
nineteenth-century corporate codes that restricted size, lines of
business, and mergers, were a staple of congressional life from 1900
48
until 1914. All were motivated by a perceived public interest in
49
competitive production and against industry concentration. But
50
the clamour for corporate reform abated after 1914. At both the
state and federal levels a consensus formed that the Sherman Act’s
approach to antitrust, broadly directed to restraints of trade, worked
better than corporate law’s rules-based restrictions on lines of
business and combinations, which had not provided a viable basis
51
for distinguishing between good and bad mergers.
2.

State Corporate Codes after 1913

Legislative innovation at the state level never again reached the
intensity experienced in the wake of New Jersey’s competitive
initiative.
But three smaller waves of change did occur in
subsequent decades. Here we describe the first two, which occurred
in the 1920s and 1960s. The third wave, the state antitakeover
52
statutes of the 1980s, will be taken up in Part I.B.3.
The first round of innovation came in the wake of the boom
stock market of the 1920s. Corporations and their promoters,
utilizing the corporate codes’ allowance of nonvoting preferred and
common stock, took advantage of the market boom to float new
equity issues that carried no sacrifice of control. But, in 1926, the
53
NYSE intervened with a one share/one vote rule.
Delaware
followed up with give backs, removing from its code some remaining
constraints on stock issuance. First, in 1927, it removed one last
mandate respecting affiliation terms—preemptive rights—which
the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California Regarding Legal
Opinions in Business Transactions, 45 BUS. L. 2169, 2198 (1990); Scott
FitzGibbon & Donald W. Glazer, Legal Opinions on Incorporation, Good
Standing, and Qualification to Do Business, 41 BUS. L. 461, 473 (1986).
47. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 695 (2002) (showing that Delaware
lawyers are the most highly paid in any state).
48. Mitchell, supra note 14, at ch. 6, 1-4.
49. Id. See also John W. Brabner-Smith, Federal Incorporation of Business,
24 VA. L. REV. 159, 163-66 (1937).
50. Stoke, supra note 13, at 579.
51. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 247-48, 266-67.
52. See infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
53. Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 687 (1987).
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thereafter became optional. Second, in March 1929, it amended its
55
code to permit blank stock charter provisions,
permitting
corporations to waive shareholder ratification respecting the terms
of new stock issues and enhancing management’ s freedom of
56
action respecting equity capital structure.
Third, and also in
March 1929, Delaware sanctioned the issue of stock option
warrants, facilitating the distribution of bargain purchase rights to
57
insiders even in a world of one share/one vote.
Figure I: Market Context 1920-41
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The stock market crash six months later caused the venue of
corporate law innovation to move to the national level and stay
there for three decades. At the same time, new incorporation
activity in Delaware slowed substantially. Delaware would not
59
equal the dollar amount of its 1929 chartering revenues until 1952.
Even then, 1952 in no sense equalled 1929 so far as concerned
Delaware’s public fisc. The portion of its revenues contributed by
chartering would remain under ten percent of the total until after
1967. Worse, during the 1950s and early 1960s, reincorporation to
Delaware continued only at the diminished pace set during the
54. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE
43 (1982).
55. Id.
56. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 56-57. Delaware also added a loophole
in its legal capital provisions in the late 1920s—the “nimble dividend.” Id.
57. Id.
58. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (graph developed using the
opening level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the first trading day of
each month over the course of the cycle).
59. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 535-36 tbl.2.
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60

Depression.
By 1963, revenues from chartering had declined to seven
percent of Delaware’s total, and its lawmakers began to fear
61
competition from New Jersey and Maryland.
The legislature
62
organized a law revision commission to review the code. Another
round of innovation followed, with the amendments becoming
63
effective in 1967. These added an enabling section liberalizing
indemnity of officers and directors found liable for breaches of
64
fiduciary duties. The amendments also significantly narrowed the
65
class of shareholders accorded merger appraisal rights, facilitating
66
acquisitions by large firms. Figure II shows that the equity market
environment at the time resembled that prevailing during the first
round of code innovations of the late 1920s: Delaware returned to an
aggressive, competitive mode in the “go go” stock market of the
1960s, during which the Dow Jones Industrial Average reached the
67
900 level for the first time since 1929.
68
Figure II: Market Context 1960-75
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60. Id.
61. Id. at 60.
62. Id. at 60-61.
63. Id. at 64.
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001).
65. Id. § 262(b).
66. Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of
1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 863-72 (1969). For a realistic description of the
influences that came to bear on the revision, see Ernest L. Folk III, Some
Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. BAR J. 409, 411-19
(1968).
67. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 66; Yahoo! Finance,
http://finance.yahoo.com (daily Dow Jones Industrial Average data from Oct. 1,
1928 through Dec. 31, 1969).
68. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (graph developed using the
opening level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the first trading day of
each month over the course of the cycle).
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Delaware’s initiative yielded palpable rewards. Incorporations
and reincorporations of large firms increased markedly in 1966 and
69
continued through 1971 at levels not seen since the 1920s. Even
though other states quickly copied the new provisions, Delaware’s
70
market share recovered to one-third of NYSE companies. Since
then, Delaware has steadily increased that market share. By 1977,
71
40% of publicly traded companies were organized in Delaware; in
72
1981 the figure was 44%; the 50% figure was reached again by
73
74
1991; and by 1999 the figure was 57.8%.
3.

Stability and Political Insulation

We emerge from this discussion with a confirmation, a
prediction, and a structural conclusion.
The confirmation is that state legislative innovation tends to
enhance management’s freedom of action by expanding the enabling
75
envelope.
The prediction is that management-friendly innovation tends to
occur against the background of a strong stock market. Concerns
about legitimacy and federal intervention could have something to
do with this, but marketing does also. Corporations tend to bring
reincorporation proposals to their shareholders in the wake of
76
abnormal run ups in their stock prices. The competitive state
strikes while the iron is hot, drawing attention to its product line so
69. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 505 tbl.5.
70. Comment, supra note 66, at 891-92.
71. See Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters:
“Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259, 262 (1980).
72. Stephanie S. Rojo, Comment, Delaware Versus Texas Corporate Law:
How Does Texas Compare?, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 290, 291 (2003).
73. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187,
190-91 n.6 (1991).
74. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to
Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 391 tbl.2 (2003).
75. We do not claim that all states match Delaware in providing menus of
enabling terms. For a survey of some residual mandates and an empirical
showing of their contribution to outward migration, see Marcel Kahan, The
Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover
Protection? (N.Y. Univ. Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, working paper
No. 04-017, 2004) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=557869.
For a
contrarian discussion questioning the appropriateness of mandates for
corporate law regimes in emerging economies, see Troy A. Paredes, A Systems
Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law
Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1127, 1155 (2004).
76. See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of
Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 67 (1989); Dodd &
Leftwich, supra note 71, at 272-78.
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as to focus management’s attention on the benefits of
reincorporation.
The structural point concerns the overall trajectory of state
legislative innovation. The post-1913 rounds of innovation amount
to minor adjustments to a stable legal regime. New Jersey set the
states’ enabling agenda in 1888 and the agenda remained stable for
77
eight decades thereafter.
The economic shock of crash and
depression at most brought quietude. The only political shock came
when Woodrow Wilson took the presidency and the New Jersey
legislature opened its code to the influence of the broader public’s
political concerns. The management customers in the charter
market reacted emphatically. The message has never changed:
public politics and corporate law do not mix; any significant
departure from the norm means reincorporation to another state.
Political theorists evaluate political systems in terms of their
accountability and representativeness. Accountability is high when
voters can identify the actors responsible for making policy and oust
those who perform badly. Representativeness is high when policies
78
reflect the preferences of a large spectrum of voters. The larger the
political subdivision, the more likely it is that policies are broadly
representative, as politicians are forced to seek the support of broad
coalitions, representing multiple socioeconomic groups. In smaller
districts, competing politicians may cater to narrower, geographical
79
constituencies.
Charter competition rearranges the conventional patterns. The
possibility of reincorporation out of the state assures a high degree
of accountability. But now accountability goes not to the voters of
the state (whether a broad or narrow coalition), but to the firms’
managers and shareholders, who react not as voting citizens but as
economic interest holders. Paradoxically, we simultaneously see a
high degree of representativeness, at least in the one state with a
stake in chartering revenues. So far as the concerns the people of
Delaware, any corporate law policy that suits the chartering
customers also suits them. This complete concord between the
voters of the chartering state and the chartered firms cordons off
corporate law from conventional political influences and
concomitant regulatory volatility. Such a stable political settlement
could never be reached at the federal level, where broad political

77. Bayless Manning pronounced corporate law intellectually dead in 1962.
See Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962).
78. TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO TABELLINI, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
CONSTITUTIONS 12, 17 (2003).
79. Id. at 17-18.
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coalitions could contest it.
The stable settlement holds out a possibility of externalities, of
course. Even as the dominant chartering state makes corporate law
without regard to conventional politics within its borders, its firms
carry its law across the wider national political and economic
geography. As a national lawmaker, it potentially impacts the
economic interests of actors nationwide, actors who may be badly
represented or entirely unrepresented in its lawmaking process and
to whom it is unaccountable. To the extent that corporate law has
political implications at the more broadly representative national
arena, such an arrangement is politically tolerable only given the
possibility of preemption by the national government.
Any
disadvantaged group or broad public interest coalition gets a right to
contest the state-level result by making a political appeal to the
Congress. In view of the fact that a chartering state may impose its
law outside its borders only due to a federal constitutional
80
mandate, federal political contestability makes structural sense.
B.

Chartering Races

Because national-level political appeals are a constant
structural possibility, national respect for state control over internal
corporate affairs remains in a contingent posture. The magnitude of
respect accorded could vary in response to prevailing views on the
state system’s welfare effects, with normative frameworks used in
evaluating the state system bearing on national responses. This
section sets out the two leading evaluative paradigms: trust and
market. Under the trust paradigm, charter competition is described
as a race to the bottom. The market paradigm reverses the story,
describing a race to the top.
1.

The Trust Paradigm and the Race to the Bottom

The race to the bottom charge dates back to charter
competition’s first appearance, when critics denounced it for
81
facilitating anticompetitive activity. Subsequent decades saw no
abatement of criticism, even as the critics shifted their focus. The
leading basis for denunciation became the trust paradigm
articulated in 1932 by Berle and Means in The Modern Corporation
82
and Private Property.
The enabling state system, said Berle and Means, had
facilitated the appearance and success of the large, mass-producing,
80. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
81. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 580 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
82. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3.
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management-controlled corporation. The law thereby had become
implicated in the creation and perpetuation of an unsatisfactory
separation of ownership and control. The big corporations of the
twentieth century had split the classical entrepreneurial function
between salaried executives, who sat atop hierarchical
organizations, and anonymous equity participants, who held small
stakes and prized market liquidity over participation.
This
presented problems of competence and responsibility absent in an
ideal, classical, capitalist world inhabited by self-employed
84
individual producers. In the classical model, market competition
effectively controlled the producers, constraining both the
incompetent and the greedy and legitimating private economic
power. But corporate mass production on a large capital base broke
those parameters, with firms taking on significant attributes and
85
powers, social as well as economic. Industrial oligarchs exercised
unified control over the wealth under their charge, and the law
86
played a role in investing the power. Therefore, said Berle and
Means, corporate property should no longer be deemed private
87
property. That assertion in turn supported a presumption favoring
new regulation of corporate internal affairs.
Berle and Means recommended no pervasive system of national
oversight, however. Instead, they focused on the problem of
management self-dealing in the context of the enabling system.
Corporate insiders were writing their own contracts, with immunity
clauses and waivers of shareholder rights allowing much diversion
88
of corporate profit to managers’ pockets. The law, they said, would
do a better job if it were rewritten to follow basic principles of trust
89
law.
More particularly, there should be a pervasive equitable
limitation on powers granted to corporate management (or any other
group within the corporation) by the enabling system: power should
90
be exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders.
Enforcement of the equitable limitation safely could be remitted to
the state judiciary. In Berle and Means’ view, charter competition
impacted only statutes, leaving the common law of fiduciary duties
as the one area of corporate law remaining robust: “[f]lexible and
83. Id. at 7.
84. Id. at 3, 5, 7, 9.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id. at 4, 131.
87. Id. at 219.
88. Id. at 128, 220, 312.
89. Id. at 220.
90. Id. at 220. Berle and Means had in mind an overarching standard that
would constrain the enabling system ex post: no language in a corporate charter
could deny or defeat the fundamental equitable control of the court. Id. at 242.
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realistic” judges, “if untrammeled by statute,” could be expected to
91
find solutions to problems that demanded a remedy.
Events did not unfold in accordance with the book’s description,
however.
Delaware’s judges did indeed prove “[f]lexible and
realistic,” but their flexibility followed their realism and so benefited
management interests. By the 1960s, observers attempting to
explain why no other state had wrested a significant market share
away from Delaware were mentioning Delaware’s courts as well as
its code. The accumulated stock of precedent was mentioned, along
with competence and fairness. But Sam Arsht, a dean of the
Delaware bar, added a telling point—corporations considered
92
Delaware the most favorable forum available.
The results frustrated proponents of the trust paradigm, whose
views were embodied in William L. Cary’s famous indictment of
93
Delaware, published in 1974. Cary reviewed leading Delaware
opinions, along with the statutory developments reviewed above,
and concluded that Delaware had “no public policy left . . . except
94
the objective of raising revenue.” To Cary, the “public policy” at
stake was the integrity of corporate managers. Rents had led a
single state to “grant management unilateral control untrammeled
95
by other interests,” thereby sacrificing the national public interest.
Charter competition was a “race to the bottom.” The stable
settlement between Delaware and the chartering firms meant that
corporate law addressed only the interests of a narrow class of
management consumers, causing it to be more and more removed
from the public interest.
Cary recommended a preemptive federal regime of fiduciary
standards, a traversal of internal affairs that might have enervated
the charter market. Unlike the federal mandates we see in
96
practice,
fiduciary standards would have removed fiduciary
lawmaking to the federal courts, destroying Delaware’s body of case
precedents and removing its judiciary from the front line of
corporate lawmaking. Given the gradual convergence of corporate

91. Id. at 197, 295.
92. Comment, supra note 66, at 893-94.
93. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
94. Id. at 684; see also Marvin A. Chirelstein, Towards a Federal Fiduciary
Standards Act, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 203 (1981).
95. Cary, supra note 93, at 697, 698.
96. If the federal mandates described above at any time adversely affected
Delaware, they did so in the period between 1929 and 1967, when Delaware lost
market share and suffered reduced revenue support from chartering. Since the
mandates stayed in place after Delaware’s 1967 recovery, it seems sounder to
refrain from inferring a negative impact during any period.
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codes, Delaware’s customers thereupon might have reappraised the
97
costs and benefits of domicile in the state.
2.

The Market Paradigm and the Race to the Top

The market paradigm rebuts both the trust paradigm’s
description of separated ownership and control and its call for
regulation. This perspective, which originated in economics during
the 1960s and 1970s, recasts the firm as an incident of contracting
98
among rational economic actors. The firm becomes a series of
contracts joining inputs to outputs, with equity capital as one of the
inputs and corporate law as a part of the input’s governing
99
contract. The imperfections identified under the trust paradigm
reemerge under the denomination “agency costs,” costs that firms
must minimize due to the free market’s competitive force. Managers
are no longer seen as empowered actors, and responsibility is no
longer seen as a problem. When managers fail, they get removed—
either a hostile offeror takes over the company and throws them
100
out, the firm with a high agency cost base fails to survive in the
product market, or poor managers fail to survive in the management
labor market. Their incentives accordingly are focused on long-run
101
productive success for the firm.
Given these market deterrents,
corporate property again becomes private, the regulatory agenda
goes blank, and a powerful presumption lies against national
102
intervention.
97. While Berle and Means limited the trust paradigm’s class of
beneficiaries to the corporation’s shareholders, many of the paradigm’s
subsequent proponents expanded the zone of beneficiary to include other
corporate constituents and the public interest. The “public” characterization in
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY invited the extension. So did
the book’s emphasis on managerial power: to mid-twentieth century
antimanagerialists, power implied responsibility and, given the separation of
ownership and control, responsibility needed to be imposed in law—federal law.
See NADER, ET AL., supra note 45, at 1, 7; see also Robert A. Dahl, Governing the
Giant Corporation, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 10, 12 (Ralph Nader &
Mark J. Green eds., 1973).
98. William W. Bratton, The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 420 (1989).
99. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 305, 310. For a review of the
literature, see Bratton, supra note 98, at 420.
100. This point originated in Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 120 n.34 (1965). For a discussion of
Manne’s contribution, see William J. Carney, The Legacy of “The Market for
Corporate Control” and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 215 (1999).
101. Bratton, supra note 98, at 417-18.
102. William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual
Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 186-90 (1992).
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The market paradigm also counters Cary’s denunciation of
Delaware. It draws on public choice theory to debunk the public
interest ideal of regulatory motivation and assert that regulators
should be expected to behave no differently than actors in private
103
economic relations.
There is, accordingly, nothing suspicious
about the sale of charters. This point, coupled with the market
deterrent story of well-aligned agent incentives, reverses the race to
104
the bottom into a race to the top.
In the race to the top
description, state corporate codes and judicial venues are viewed as
products consumed by corporations. Competition for the legal
business of firms forces the states to adapt the law to the dynamic
conditions in which the firms operate. State lawmaking emerges as
a trial-and-error process suited to the accurate identification of
105
optimal corporate arrangements.
3. State Antitakeover Statutes, the Structural Defect, and the
Failure of the Market Paradigm
Each paradigm, trust and market, has a strong ideological
affinity. The trust perspective suits progressives disposed to impose
regulations that disempower managers and protect actors in
vulnerable economic positions. As such, it lost its leading role in
public policy discussion after 1980, along with the general collapse
of confidence in regulatory solutions to economic problems. The
trust paradigm still echoes in a significant body of academic
106
commentary. But it neither informs corporate law agendas in the
wider polity nor figures importantly in contemporary criticisms of
the charter competition system.
The market paradigm presents an ideological mirror image. It
suits deregulatory policy agendas and devolutionary federalists.
The deregulatory 1980s should have carried it to unquestioned
ascendancy in corporate law discussions. But it instead ran into an
unanticipated public choice problem when the mature, state-level
enabling system underwent a third and final round of statutory
107
innovation.

103. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167,
168-69 (1990).
104. See Ralph W. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977).
105. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6 (1993).
106. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (challenging the shareholder
primacy norm).
107. See infra notes 109-13.

2006]

CORPORATE FEDERALISM
Figure III: Market Context 1982-88

4/21/87
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp:
Supreme Court upholds IN
takeover statute

2,500

1,500

108

4/87 – 10/87
Fourteen states
enact secondgeneration takeover
statutes

3,000

Dow 2,000
Jones
Ind. Avg.

641

6/23/82
Edgar v. MITE:
U.S. Supreme Court
declares IL takeover
statute unconstitutional

7/82 – 4/87
Over twenty states enact
second-generation
takeover statutes
2/2/88
Delaware’s secondgeneration takeover
statute is enacted

1,000

500
5/80 9/80 1/81 5/81 9/81 1/82 5/82 9/82 1/83 5/83 9/83 1/84 5/84 9/84 1/85 5/85

9/85

1/86 5/86 9/86 1/87 5/87 9/87 1/88

During the 1980s, a majority of the states added antitakeover
provisions to their codes. The statutes entered territory where free
contract formerly had prevailed, making takeovers more expensive
and variously containing shareholder rights of alienation and
109
decisionmaking.
The statutes began to appear in the 1960s and
1970s, but changed in form after 1982, when the Supreme Court, in
110
Edgar v. MITE Corp., invoked the Commerce Clause to invalidate
state statutes that subjected hostile tender offers to substantive
review by state securities administrators. The new statutes, which
operated in traditional internal affairs territory, passed
constitutional inspection in 1987, when the Supreme Court decided
111
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.
Twenty states enacted
such statutes in the years between the two rulings, with fourteen
112
more acting in the six months after CTS.
Delaware, lagging,
113
followed in 1988.
The antitakeover round followed the earlier pattern of state law
innovation in two significant respects. The statutes once again were
enacted against the backdrop of a booming stock market, as shown

108. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (generated using the closing
price of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on each day of the historical period);
see also Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and
Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 461-63 (1988).
109. More specifically, the statutes tended either to condition the voting
right of bidders on the approval of the shareholders as a whole, to impose freeze
periods on combinations between bidders and targets, or to require that an
equal price be paid in the second stage of a two-tier acquisition. For a
summary, see ROMANO, supra note 105, at 53-57, 74-75.
110. 457 U.S. 624, 640-46 (1982).
111. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
112. Romano, supra note 108, at 461.
113. Id. at 464, 464 n.16.
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above in Figure III. They also catered to management’s interest in
freedom of action.
But the antitakeover statutes also broke the pattern in
significant respects. Innovations in the bull markets of the 1920s
and 1960s facilitated deal making; here the states chilled
114
transactions.
Formerly, state law innovation almost always
moved in an enabling direction. Here, even as the governance
device of shareholder ratification figured prominently, so did
mandates. Formerly, the first mover had been Delaware, the
charter market leader. Here, states that did not pursue charters
made the first move. Where Delaware innovated with an eye to
business preferences nationwide, the states enacting antitakeover
statutes moved at the behest of nervous managers with local
115
influence.
The politics were unrepresentative.
Threatened
managers and local lawyers, acting independently of local business,
labor, and community leaders, used their influence to procure
116
legislation.
The responsive legislators in effect externalized the
costs of takeover defense on out-of-state shareholders. Rising stock
prices also figured into the picture: takeover activity, friendly as
well as hostile, rises and falls with the stock market.
The Delaware process differed, reflecting the more diverse
constituency swept in by its law’s national reach. Managers seeking
protection (and their lawyers) lobbied in favor of takeover defense,
some even threatening to pull out of the state. They were countered
by institutional investors, shareholders organizations, and SEC
117
commissioners.
A weak statute emerged.
The equilibrium pattern broke because, with the hostile offers of
the 1980s, the enabling framework, for the first time in its history,
held out an effective means of management removal unimpeded by
the shareholder collective action problem. When the states adjusted
by erecting new barriers, the shareholders, again for the first time
in corporate law history, went into irreconcilable opposition.
Previously, the states’ successive moves to extend managers more
slack had failed to rouse shareholder opposition. There were a
number of reasons for the shareholders’ cooperative attitude. First,
as the trust proponents noted, the shareholders suffered collective
action problems. Second, under the Wall Street Rule, shareholders
were content to resort to exit by market sale when excessive slack
led to poor results. Third, since 1934, the SEC had stood in to

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 462.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 463-64.
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protect shareholder interests at the national level. Sleazy market
practices facilitated by enabling innovations in the 1920s had been
dealt with by federal disclosure and market regulation mandates.
In the 1980s, however, federal regulators did not come to the
shareholders’ rescue.
Institutional shareholding, meanwhile,
ameliorated the collective action problem. Now organized, the
shareholders found their voice, a dissenting voice.
Just as the market paradigm had enervated the trust paradigm,
so did the market paradigm now suffer enervation. The marketbased race to the top validation of state law had bypassed the
problem of the shareholders’ lack of influence over state lawmaking
with a reference to the control market deterrent. The assertion, in
effect, was that the managers’ option of exit adequately disciplined
the states, while the possibility of shareholder exit by tender to a
hostile offeror adequately disciplined the managers.
The
collaboration of managers and state politicians to hamper the
market deterrent presented a manifest case of charter market
failure. The responsive states had acted to contain the very
mechanism on which the market paradigm relied to incentivize
corporate agents. Charter competition, far from acting as a check on
rent-seeking activity, had promoted it. State law results were
anything but first-best efficient.
The failure of the market analogy was inevitable, given the
crystallization of opposing views between shareholders and
managers on the power implications of the shareholders’ right of
free transfer. The law as product analogy works as a policy
justification only to the extent that the supplying jurisdiction
purveys an unbundled regulatory product to a consumer with a
unitary set of preferences, without externalizing costs on anyone
else. The charter market does meet the former qualification—
Delaware’s customers take only its corporate law free of all other
regulations. The latter qualification has always been problematic,
for it depends on the heroic assumption that shareholder and
manager interests always are perfectly aligned, rendering irrelevant
the mandated agenda control managers enjoy under the state
system. Where, as with takeovers, interests do not stand aligned,
the state system displays a structural defect. Because the market
forces a state that actually competes to focus on the variables that
119
influence incorporation decisions, there follows a concern for

118. The promulgation of the proxy rules in the 1950s provides an example
of this. See SELIGMAN, supra note 54, at 270.
119. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1452,
1454 (1992).
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management preferences rather than shareholder value itself.
Accordingly, nothing at the state level prevents suboptimal
accommodation of management preferences respecting ex post
120
affiliation terms and fiduciary standards.
Since the defect is intrinsic to the system, regulatory correction
must occur at the national level. Should the issue be joined there,
and should the diagnosis of suboptimal results prevail there, the
internal affairs presumption, standing alone, would present no
barrier to intervention.
The economics of federalism posit
intervention to police interstate externalities as a principal
121
justification for the very existence of the national government.
Moreover, such intervention could be designed so as to cause
minimal disruption at the state level. It could even prove beneficial.
We have suggested elsewhere that the federal government could
partially preempt the states’ provision of management agenda
control and mandate a right of shareholder initiative to effect
122
reincorporation.
We projected that such an adjustment could
jumpstart the charter market and import a state-level incentive to
create a regime more single-mindedly directed to shareholder value
123
maximization.
Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell apply this
strategy in a different direction, suggesting that the federal
government create a parallel takeover regime and accord the
124
shareholders a privilege to opt into it. There is, then, no shortage
of regulatory strategies fitted to the task of correcting the charter
market’s defects. Yet the federal government has not intervened,
even as the era of shareholder capitalism dawned in the wake of the
takeover wars of the 1980s.
4.

How Robust is the Charter Market?

A growing body of commentary criticizes Delaware and the
charter market from a different perspective, that of microeconomic
theory. The market, it is charged, little resembles an efficient
product market—a market that maximizes welfare by producing in

120. Id. at 1462-63, 1468, 1488.
121. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Federalism and European Business Law, 14
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 127 (1994).
122. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition,
Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 193647 (1995).
123. Id.
124. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover
Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111 (2001). See Stephen J.
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law,
87 VA. L. REV. 961, 975-77, 991 (2001) (suggesting that the proposal might have
minor perverse effects).
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125

It is instead a bundle of
the competitive equilibrium quantity.
126
suboptimal distortions.
Delaware charges much more for its
product than its marginal cost of production and its franchise tax
127
rates implicate price discrimination.
Other states have no
incentives to compete with Delaware, leaving their regimes open to
128
suboptimal influence activities by managers and lawyers. Even if
actors in another state had incentives to attempt to enter the
market to take market share from Delaware, structural barriers
129
would make competitive success highly unlikely.
Delaware, for
example, takes the benefit of network and learning externalities
130
incident to the sale of an integrated legal system. Its system also
is surprisingly friendly to litigating plaintiffs, toward the manifest
131
end of generating rents for its bar.
This thickening description teaches us much about the charter
market. But we do not perceive any significant implications for the
internal affairs presumption and the content of federalism. We have
five reasons. First, the regulatory competition description of state
125. HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 325
(2003).
126. Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate Law, (Harvard John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 377, 2002) develops a
formal product market model that incorporates many of the main points of this
line of thinking.
127. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market
for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1211, 1215-19 (2001); see also
Michal Barzuza, Price Considerations in the Market for Corporate Law, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 127, 132 (2004) (describing Delaware’s pricing as reflecting a
trade off between benefits to managers and injury to shareholder value due to
suboptimal law, with Delaware charging less than it might otherwise).
128. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 735-40 (2002).
129. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition
in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1820 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the
Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 557 (2002).
130. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH.
U. L.Q. 347 (1996); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1910 (1998); Michael
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 845-46 (1995).
131. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 471-72 (1987). See also
Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559,
1580 (2002) (noting that the personal interests of chartering lawyers in addition
to the substance of the legal regime determines the choice of domicile); Kahan &
Kamar, supra note 128, at 695 (showing that Delaware lawyers have average
incomes higher than those of any other state).
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law only provides a self-standing justification on the assumption a
parallel market for corporate control imports incentive
compatibility. Once the states chilled the takeover threat, federal
intervention could be justified whether or not Delaware faced active
competition. Second, the structure of state law showed remarkable
stability between 1896 and the takeover wars of the 1980s, and that
structure was determined in a manifestly competitive environment.
Potential entrants prompted Delaware to legislative action as late
132
as 1967.
Third, Delaware always remains subject to potential
133
competition from other states. If, like New Jersey in 1913, it
defected from the political settlement and took a public-interest
view of regulation, the firms would find somewhere else to go. The
same thing would happen if the quality of its lawmaking took a
costly adverse turn. Similarly, were Delaware to raise its rents to
the point where firms found it too costly, its business would drop off,
causing it to reconsider both its franchise tax scheme and litigation
rules. Fourth, no one forces firms to go to Delaware and pay the
rents. And if there is a group of consumers in the world well suited
to contractual self-protection, it is Delaware’s customers. Indeed,
134
more than forty percent of publicly traded firms choose to stay out.
So, even though a pinpointed federal intervention could in theory
jumpstart the charter market, such intervention is a remote
possibility as a political proposition. Excess rents to Delaware and
other imperfections highlighted by analogy to the economics of
industrial organization seem an improbable basis for invoking
national entry into internal affairs.
Fifth, and most important, the economics of federalism looks
beyond competition to support a presumption favoring state- and
local-level regulation. So long as production costs are equal,
decentralized regulation is favored because it is more responsive—it
narrows the variance in the distribution of preferences, reduces the
likelihood of bundled preferences, and ameliorates problems of
135
asymmetric information.
On the majority of matters as to which
management and shareholder interests stand in alignment, the
century-old political settlement between firms and the competitive
chartering state, with its extraordinarily high degree of
accountability, fits this description. At the same time, the market
paradigm succeeds in an important respect, despite its

132. NADER ET AL., supra note 19, at 64.
133. Id. at 50-51.
134. BEBCHUK & COHEN, supra note 74, at 389.
135. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World,
86 GEO. L.J. 201, 215 (1997).
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shortcomings.
Cary’s public interest objection to the sale of
corporate law no longer carries weight. Charter competition is no
longer seen as inherently corrupt. It is viewed functionally in the
wider legal and economic framework of shareholder capitalism.
The picture of an uncompetitive charter market holds out
devastating implications not for the internal affairs presumption but
for the economic theory of regulatory competition. This economics
dates back a half century. It got off to a bright start. For a while it
was thought that devolution within federations could be relied on to
trigger races to the top respecting diverse subject matters.
Competition for domiciliaries and factors of production was posited
as the cure for public choice problems. Under the theory, citizens
signal their preferences respecting legal goods and services when
they migrate from regime to regime.
Their ability to exit
disempowers government actors, whose welfare diminishes as
136
citizens depart, taking along votes and revenues. Competition for
domiciliaries and factors of production, having disabled the interest
groups, then causes government policies to be matched with diverse
137
citizen preferences.
A preference for state over national
lawmaking also is implied, since the revenue enhancement
138
constraint on the national government is less intense.
Because
national-level competitive constraints also are less intense, the
national lawmaking process will be slower, less responsive to
productive concerns, and more susceptible to the influence of
139
organized interest groups.
The theory ran into two problems. First, multiple frictions at
the state level impair competition. These include product bundling,
mobility costs, spillovers, information asymmetries, and the absence
140
of entrepreneurial incentives on the part of government actors.
Second, even assuming competitive incentives at the state level, the
economics proved incapable of predicting stable, long-term
141
equilibriums in competitive lawmaking situations.
Charter
competition, along with other cases where a conflict of laws regime
allows actors to chose a nominal jurisdictional situs for a legal
relationship, are the exceptional cases where the theory has
descriptive power.
This is because nominally sited legal
142
relationships can be sold separately as unbundled legal products.
136. See Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a
Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGILL L.J. 130, 142-43 (1991).
137. ROMANO, supra note 105, at 4-5.
138. Id. at 4-5, 48.
139. Id. at 5.
140. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 135, at 260.
141. Id. at 261.
142. Id. at 267.
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Given something to sell, entrepreneurial lawmakers can appear. Of
course, as we have seen with New Jersey and Delaware, a
concomitant private sector sideline, in the form of service company
profits, may be necessary to jump start the operation. But the
service companies, along with other rent-seeking intermediaries,
also serve a market function because they correct information
asymmetries. With corporate law, a stable lawmaking equilibrium
resulted. But, as we also have seen, externalities have remained a
problem.
The
scholarship
highlighting
the
charter
market’s
uncompetitive character shows that the problems do not stop with
externalities. Even in these close to ideal conditions we have yet to
see a competitive lawmaking equilibrium that stands up when
inspected under the criteria applied to product markets. We suspect
that entrepreneurial incentives lie at the core of the problem. New
Jersey and Delaware are exceptional in their entrepreneurship. We
do not tend to see similar behavior in other state and local situations
where proponents suggest competitive regulatory solutions. Given
this, we find it odd to hear that the charter competition system is
infirm because rents provide its incentives. Absent the rents it is
difficult to imagine the charter competition system ever coming into
existence in the first place.
Competition, then, does not provide a stand-alone justification
for a strong internal affairs presumption. But we do not think this
makes for a federalism problem for Delaware. To our knowledge, no
first-best lawmaking equilibrium has ever been identified, so it is
not clear to us why the charter market needs to be judged by that
measure in the first place.
C.

Summary: The Stable Equilibrium

The state system can be described as a stable equilibrium.
Drawing on concepts from evolutionary game theory, we see that
prior to 1920 New Jersey adopted a noncooperative strategy, turning
corporate law making into a strategic game directed to the
acquisition of rents from managers looking for responsive, enabling
legal frameworks, despite negative consequences for other states.
There followed a period of learning (or adaptive behavior) during
143
which other states adjusted their strategies, following New Jersey.
New Jersey then abandoned its strategy for exogenous political
reasons. Delaware, playing New Jersey’s original strategy, captured
its rents. Delaware has been playing noncooperatively vis-à-vis the
other states ever since. Within the game, an enabling corporate
143. See LARRY SAMUELSON, EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
SELECTION 22-24 (1997).

AND

EQUILIBRIUM

2006]

CORPORATE FEDERALISM

649

code that also vests agenda control over governance matters in
management amounts to an evolutionary stable strategy—any state
144
without one risks the loss of its significant charters; any state
innovation that fails to follow the strategy will not succeed.
Meanwhile, Delaware’s agents resemble rational maximizers,
seeking to protect the state’s rents. They update and learn on an
ongoing basis, adjusting their strategies respecting the terms of
145
corporate law as they face new situations. The history shows that
so long as the states are left alone to play the game, corporate law
146
nearly approaches a stationary state.
The state system and its stable equilibrium pose two questions
for federal lawmakers.
The first is whether to respect the
equilibrium’s exclusion of regulation referenced to the wider public
interest. Here a federal decision to intervene could so displace the
states as to destroy the equilibrium and the strategies and rents
that keep it stable. The second question is whether the state
equilibrium succeeds as shareholder capitalism, according the
shareholders meaningful ultimate control and succeeding in
directing management in the shareholders’ interest. Here, views
144. Id. at 17.
145. Id. at 23. Conventional game theory with its stringent rationality
requirements teaches us little about how norms can be self-enforcing. See Paul
G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role
of Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1300-01 (2003) (showing counterfactuals are destabling for equilibrium strategies, such as the def-for-dev, and always defect).
Dissatisfied with the stringent rationality requirements of standard Nash
equilibrium approach to strategic environments, the evolutionary game theory
literature makes less stringent assumptions regarding the knowledge and
understanding of the players. But a key assumption is made about learning
processes of players—that a player’s behavior will adapt to the new
circumstances posed by the game. SAMUELSON, supra note 143, at 91. The
learning dynamic allows players to distinguish between noise (cheap talk) and
out-of-equilibrium strategies (real threats), which could cause the system to
move toward another equilibrium. The learning process is crucial for the
charter market game because Delaware’s agents have needed to accumulate,
through many rounds of play, sufficient experience to learn the optimal
behavior required to keep the system in equilibrium.
146. SAMUELSON, supra note 143, at 26; see also David P. Baron, The
Economics and Politics of Regulation: Perspectives, Agenda, and Approaches, in
MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 27-32 (Jeffrey S. Banks & Eric A. Hanushek eds.,
1995) (describing the mechanisms that produce long-run institutional stability).
Cf. JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, INCENTIVES AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 189-206 (2000)
(showing formally that a continuum equilibrium emerges when a principal can
write side-contracts with agents that elicit information about collusive interest
group activities); Jean Tirole, Collusion and the Theory of Organizations, in 2
ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY, SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS, at 151-206 (1992)
(showing similar results when enforcement is by reputation rather than
collusive side contract).
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differ on the probable state level effects of federal intervention.
Some argue that the states’ failure to contain externalities and
regulate toward the end of shareholder value maximization rebuts
the internal affairs presumption and justifies corrective
147
intervention.
As we have seen, they also argue that this can be
done in a way that forces the states to change their strategies,
accommodating the shareholder interest and changing their
strategy without cutting off the rent incentive. Others take the
position that the stable equilibrium holds out such benefits that any
shortcomings must be forgiven. They point out that the political
agenda at the federal level is highly contestable. Management
remains a more concentrated group than the shareholders and thus
more able to wield influence. It could co-opt a federal reform
process, for example procuring legislation making takeovers more
148
expensive still. That risk, together with the possibility of perverse
149
effects stemming from the federal habit of governance by mandate,
implies a preference for the states’ enabling equilibrium, with its
150
high degree of accountability within the corporate community.
The corporate federalism question devolves into an assessment
of the weight to be accorded these warnings. To assist that
appraisal, the next Part of this Article inquires into the political
dynamics that trigger federal intervention into internal affairs. It
shows that the notions of the public interest that motivate nationallevel regulators have over time synchronized better and better with
the state equilibrium.
II.

POLITICAL ECONOMY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The federal government took the lead in regulating the
securities markets when it added disclosure, antifraud, and insider
151
trading mandates in 1933 and 1934.
Under the internal affairs
norm, as thereafter articulated, markets and disclosure were federal
subject matters, while other corporate subject matters were

147. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
148. Choi & Guzman, supra note 124, at 975-76.
149. William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
715, 757 (1998) (arguing that interest group rent seeking will result from
shifting the lawmaking venue to the federal level); Id. at 977.
150. ROMANO, supra note 105, at 4-5, 48-50, 75-76.
151. The federal disclosure regime less displaced the states than it did the
NYSE listing requirements, which had required annual financial reports in
1907, semiannual financials in 1917, quarterly financials in 1923, and
independent audits in 1932. See GILBERT W. COOKE, THE STOCK MARKETS 340
(rev. ed. 1969); Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance:
Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
961, 970, 970 n.40, 977 (2003).
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presumptively left to the states and the stable equilibrium. Despite
the norm, the federal government and the stock exchanges since
that time have progressively, albeit episodically, entered into
internal affairs. These interventions are historically contingent,
152
occurring when political demands are registered nationally.
Despite the contingent and episodic nature of these federal
entries, federalism has evolved toward an equilibrium balance.
Where the exchange of a product for rents describes the state
equilibrium, the federal equilibrium is political. Where the state
equilibrium is self-enforcing, federal actors have a range of
strategies at their disposal and a zone of discretion. They could play
uncooperatively, intervening so as to terminate the rents and the
state equilibrium. They also could be wholly cooperative, leaving
internal affairs to the states. Strategies actually chosen depend on
political norms and pressures, which in turn depend heavily on the
environment in which the game is played. We accordingly should
not expect the federal-state game to replicate the stability we see in
the states because the federal game is political and driven by
exogenous events. Even so, four patterns can be discerned in the
history of federal incursions on internal affairs. Together they
suggest the evolution of a stable, cooperative strategy at the federal
level.
The first pattern concerns subject matter. Interventions tend to
address topics, legal compliance most prominently, as to which
unilateral action by Delaware would be inadequate to fully satisfy
national political demands. This follows in part from the federal
structure: national demands create a need for parallel action across
all fifty states. It also follows from the properties of the state
equilibrium. In the charter market, the evolutionarily stable
strategy is fidelity to the management interest. If Delaware shifted
to a strategy of imposing hardwired accountability and enforcement,
it would be viewed as a defection against management and would
disrupt the equilibrium, reducing Delaware’s rents. The same thing
would happen if Delaware mandated governance processes. It
follows that not only does federal intervention accomplish results
unavailable in the states, the stable equilibrium disables the states
from preemptively anticipating federal strategies. The states’
152. The state-federal comparison here bears a resemblance to the
comparison of state law in this country and Japanese corporate law in Mark D.
West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanations
from Japan and the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 588-91 (2001).
Federal corporate law in this country responds to exogenous shocks where state
law shows more stability, just as West shows that Japan’s unitary system is
more shock sensitive than the United State’s state corporate law, considered
alone.
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evolutionarily stable strategy embeds the legal regime. At the same
time, because the federal government never makes full use of its
constitutional preemptive authority, the federal-state equilibrium
has a cooperative aspect.
The second pattern concerns political substance.
Federal
chartering, the public interest strategy holding out the greatest
threat to the state equilibrium, never reached the top of the federal
political agenda after 1920. More generally, initiatives implicating
sharp ideological partisanship do not find their way into federallevel mandates. Neither the trust paradigm (broadly or narrowly
stated) nor the market paradigm has motivated national-level
interventions. But a third approach, which we call the “governance
agenda,” does carry descriptive weight. Under this approach, the
federal government intervenes to adjust state equilibrium results for
the benefit of the shareholders, largely restricting itself to
governance instruments found on a self-regulatory menu. The
pattern implies a norm of cooperation.
The third pattern concerns the relative influence of
shareholders and managers. The presence of the SEC hardwires an
influential voice for the shareholder interest at the federal level,
even as the management interest at times also proves influential.
Either way, federal interventions are stock market sensitive, with
shareholder-directed interventions coming in the wake of adverse
economic shocks and management-directed interventions occurring
during buoyant markets.
The fourth pattern manifests the operative federalism. Even as
the federal government and the stock exchanges cross the internal
affairs line and mandate governance strategies, they have never
disrupted the state equilibrium.
National intervention has
impacted neither the basic terms of the state settlement nor
Delaware’s rent flows, once again implying a cooperative strategy.
Contrariwise, even as federal moves have prompted Delaware to
adjust its strategies on occasion, Delaware never goes so far as to
imitate federal strategies.
Part II.A looks at the counterfactual empty set, federal level
agendas under the trust and market paradigms and the failure of
both federal chartering and the protakeover agenda. Part II.B looks
at the political climate surrounding the two most prominent federal
interventions into internal affairs since 1934, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Part II.C contrasts the
political climate surrounding the Williams Act and other
management directed federal interventions. Part II.D summarizes.
A.

The Trust and Market Paradigms at the Federal Level
Federal

incorporation

proposals

antedate

the

federal
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government itself—James Madison mooted the idea at the
153
Constitutional Convention.
Federal incorporation went on to
reach the top of the national policy agenda as a first reaction to the
appearance of charter competition. But its proponents in successive
administrations never managed to put together the broad-based
154
coalition needed to secure passage in Congress.
After 1920,
federal chartering never regained comparable political salience,
even as the trust paradigm’s adherents brought it back to the
national agenda on two later occasions. This section takes the
benefit of hindsight to explain those later failures, drawing a
parallel to the failure of the market paradigm’s proponents to invoke
federal preemptive power to protect the hostile takeover.
1.

The New Deal

Federal incorporation had a place on the agendas of a number of
prominent New Dealers, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and SEC
155
Chairman William O. Douglas not least among them.
They were
joined by Senators Joseph O’Mahoney and William Borah, who
promoted the idea in Congress during the second Roosevelt
administration. O’Mahoney and Borah wanted to make federal
incorporation the vehicle for an omnibus progressive assault on
156
management discretion. O’Mahoney’s proposed bill revived old
antitrust agenda items, adding to them Berle and Means’ rule of
trusteeship and other current items from the governance agenda.
O’Mahoney also included the labor agenda, mandating compliance
with the National Labor Relations Act as an internal corporate
157
duty.
Unfortunately for O’Mahoney, prominent actors in the
administration were opposed. Even Douglas had other matters at
the top of his agenda and in any event opposed the inclusion of
158
antitrust and labor compliance.
The best that O’Mahoney could
get from Congress was the formation of a study committee, the
159
Temporary National Economic Committee.
This brought together
six members of Congress and six agency representatives under
160
O’Mahoney’s chair.
The committee held hearings but never got
behind O’Mahoney’s omnibus approach. Its final report in 1941 had
153. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 638-39 (W. Norton & Co. ed., 1966).
154. Brabner-Smith, supra note 49, at 162-63.
155. SELIGMAN, supra note 54, at 205.
156. S. 10, 75th Cong. (1937).
157. Brabner-Smith, supra note 49, at 165.
158. SELIGMAN, supra note 54, at 207-08.
159. Id. at 209.
160. Id.
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161

no impact.
The bundling of the labor agenda has been accorded a causal
162
role in the failure of the O’Mahoney initiative.
To second the
point, reference can be made to the labor movement’s congressional
agenda since World War II, which has never targeted empowerment
in corporate internal affairs. Under an enduring American political
settlement, labor works within the model of contractual
engagement, where, since the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in
163
164
1947,
it has been fighting a rearguard political action.
Organized labor works to improve its rights to organize shopfloors,
empower the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (or nominate
a stronger enforcement agent), and secure the power of the
165
secondary boycott.
State law also shows up on the agenda, but
labor wants right-to-work laws preempted rather than state
166
corporate codes.
Today, even as union pension funds use their
shareholdings for antimanagerial initiatives, they tend to stick to
items on the institutional investors’ governance agenda, avoiding
167
labor movement issues in order to retain plausibility.

161. Id. at 209-10.
162. Id. at 210.
163. The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87
(2000).
164. See Michael H. LeRoy & John H. Johnson IV, Death by Lethal
Injunction: National Emergency Strikes Under the Taft-Hartley Act and the
Moribund Right to Strike, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 63, 126-30 (2001) (claiming that
“Taft-Hartley contextualizes strikes as a harm to the public” and that “TaftHartley injunctions played an important role in the long-term decline of
industrial unions”); Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47
CATH. U. L. REV. 763, 765 (1998) (arguing that “the Taft-Hartley law stands like
a fulcrum upon which the entire New Deal order teetered” and that, since 1947,
the labor movement in the United States has been “forced into an increasingly
defensive posture”).
165. MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER 1-2, 77-78
(2000).
166. Id. at 77. According to Professor Romano, when managers went to
state legislatures to procure antitakeover statutes in the 1980s, organized labor
sat out the political event, preferring to husband its political capital for its own
agenda items. Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73
VA. L. REV. 111, 134-37 (1987) (discussing events in Connecticut and asserting
that evidence on other states is consistent).
167. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018,
1042-74 (1998).
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The Watergate Era

When federal chartering returned to the political stage in the
168
1970s, labor figured in only incidentally.
The antitrust agenda of
the day also was separately pursued, resulting in the Hart-Scott169
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.
Federal chartering
proponents, who this time came from outside of government,
pursued a more general notion of the “public interest.” Social
reformers like Ralph Nader linked the conduct of corporate business
170
to a range of social problems.
It was thought that the benign,
pluralist vision of government had failed. Legislative results were
not protecting the public interest because business had
overwhelming political influence.
Indeed, under a theory in
circulation at the time, business did not even need to lobby
aggressively to get results: politicians automatically backed
anything that encouraged investment because they were terrified of
the political consequences of disinvestment during economic
171
downturns. The proponents sought to surmount the problems and
enforce the public interest through legal control over internal
affairs. This public interest agenda came in from the fringe when
news of improper political contributions and foreign payments made
management’s conduct of business a national political issue in the
172
post-Watergate environment.
But only a handful of legislative proposals materialized. Three
bills mandating federal chartering were introduced between 1972
173
and 1980. Of these, the focal point initiative was Senator Howard

168. Two items from the contemporaneous labor agenda show up on one
piece of proposed legislation. Representative Rosenthal’s Corporate Democracy
Act of 1980, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong. §§ 301, 401(c) (1980) contained a plantclosing-notification provision and would have amended the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”) to add a good-faith termination provision.
169. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 and 28 U.S.C. (2000)).
170. See NADER ET AL., supra note 45, 16; Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism
and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L. REV. 545, 548-49 (1984).
171. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 170-88 (1977). Alternatively, it was argued that
the regulatory state had become dysfunctional even as corporate externalities
remained a critical problem. See Elliot J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business
Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional
Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REV. 343, 347-55, 422-26 (1981) (suggesting imposition of
a norm of “altruistic capitalism”).
172. Schwartz, supra note 170, at 548-49.
173. Corporate Citizenship and Competition Act of 1975, H.R. 7481, 94th
Cong. (1975) (reintroduced as H.R. 9076 July 29, 1975); Corporate Democracy
Act of 1980, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong. (1980); Protection of Shareholders’ Rights
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Metzenbaum’s Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980, a
bill that drew on the Berle and Means trust paradigm, omitting the
broader public agenda and focusing on the shareholder interest and
the governance agendas.
Following Cary, it imposed federal
175
fiduciary standards, adding a series of process mandates including
176
an independent director board majority, audit and nominating
177
committees entirely made up of independent directors,
a
178
179
shareholder nomination mechanism, and cumulative voting.
But time was running out for antimanagerial politics in 1980. When
the Reagan administration came in the following year, the federal
agenda shifted to the market paradigm. Federal chartering has not
been heard of since on Capitol Hill.
The trust paradigm did better in the federal courts of the era
than it did in Congress. Federal courts of appeal expanded the
implied right of action under Rule 10b-5 to cover equitable fraud and
180
breaches of fiduciary duty. Had the expansion been sustained, the
states’ fiduciary regime might have been rendered superfluous as
plaintiffs opted for a more hospitable federal venue. But, in 1977, a
181
Supreme Court majority rejected the expansive reading of 10b-5,
emphatically employing the internal affairs presumption in its
182
interpretation of the securities laws.
3.

The Takeover Era

The political tables turned in 1980. Now adherents of the
183
market paradigm dominated the SEC.
Although friends of the
Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong. (1980).
174. Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567 96th Cong.
(1980).
175. Id. § 4.
176. Id. § 5.
177. Id. §§ 6, 7.
178. Id. § 8.
179. Id. § 9.
180. See Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d. 819 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that no
express allegation of deceit is required to assert a Rule 10b-5 claim); Green v.
Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev’d sub nom. Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that Rule 10b and 10b-5 should not be
extended to create uniform federal fiduciary standards); Ruckle v. Roto Am.
Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that a corporation can sue under Rule
10b-5 when it is defrauded into issuing shares). But see Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969)
(refusing to find a violation in a sale of treasury stock to a related party at a
deflated price).
181. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 479-80.
182. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (asserting that state law governs
internal affairs).
183. Romano, supra note 108, at 489.
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internal affairs presumption, they soon ran into their own problems
with the states. The states, still following the evolutionary stable
strategy, were moving to chill hostile takeovers. The market
paradigm supported preemptive intervention. Although generally
committed to regulatory devolution, the paradigm also counseled
central regulatory intervention to the extent necessary to protect a
market by keeping transactional lanes open and policing
184
externalities. The paradigm’s adherents won a single great victory
when the same Supreme Court that had protected the states from
the federal antifraud regime invalidated first generation
185
antitakeover statutes as a burden on interstate commerce.
Unfortunately, the states took advantage of the Court’s interpretive
preference for state control of internal affairs and redrafted their
186
statutes, winning the second round in the Supreme Court.
It
accordingly was up to Congress to protect the market for corporate
control.
Unfortunately, the takeover wars of the period left
Congress inundated with antitakeover constituent pressure. Most
187
proposed bills were antitakeover. The interest group alignment in
Washington tracked that in the states, with the management voice
sounding louder than the shareholder voice and the shareholders
showing no cognizable public support for preemptive intervention
188
against the states. Administration opposition sufficed to block the
189
antitakeover initiatives,
leaving the federal government in
gridlock. The outcome accordingly was decided at the state level.
4.

Summary

Now comes the question as to what these accounts teach us
about the content of corporate federalism. More specifically, to what
extent should we infer that the internal affairs norm played a causal
role in these federal level outcomes? Drawing causal inferences
from a historical pattern of inaction is a risky business, so we take a

184. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 135, at 211-12.
185. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640-46 (1982); see also A.C.
Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal
Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 905-20 (2003) (discussing Justice Powell’s
participation in both decisions and his managerialist opposition to hostile
takeovers).
186. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78 (1987).
187. Romano, supra note 108, at 458-60.
188. Id. at 488-90.
189. Id.; see also Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC’s Statutory Authority to
Promote Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO
THE CORPORATE BALLOT 9-10 (Lucian Bebchuk, ed.) (on file with author)
(forthcoming) (describing a political change in the late 1980s, pursuant to which
antitakeover views became more salient at the federal level).
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Three contrasting

a. No Federalism. Nothing in these cases compels the
inference that federalism concerns played an operative role. The
events plausibly can be read narrowly, as a series of federal-level
political failures acted out against an inherited state-level default
condition. Such a default persists so long as the actors at the higher
level of government fail to agree, and can persist even though the
terms of state regulation no longer embody a preferred outcome due
190
No inference of respect for the states need
to changed conditions.
be drawn. O’Mahoney acted at the moment in history when
intervention against the states and corporate management had a
comparatively high level of political plausibility. But he asked for
too much in challenging the political settlement that excludes labor
from internal affairs, a settlement long embedded at both the
national and state levels. Metzenbaum asked for less, but taking
advantage of hindsight, we can see that in 1980 the trust paradigm
did not command a political base adequate to push business law
reform past the management interest and into law. (The Reagan
SEC and the market paradigm encountered the same problem a few
years later.) Indeed, by 1980 the trust paradigm probably lacked
the political gravitas to reach the top of the congressional agenda,
much less to defeat the opposing interest group.
Both the trust and the market paradigms emerge in this
description as political failures. Whatever their substantive merits,
they were the projects of narrow networks of academic and policy
elites. Neither resounded strongly enough, either with the median
voter, or alternatively, the partisan agenda setters, to stay (or even
arrive) at the top of the agenda, much less to override interest group
191
opposition. No general observation about the political influence of
narrow, elite networks is intended. Academic paradigms help shape
political agendas, perhaps even contributing a focal-point solution in
192
a case where a problem has multiple competing solutions. But the
likelihood of such influence decreases as the distributional
193
consequences of the competing outcomes increase. Here, given the

190. See Fritz W. Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German
Federalism and European Integration, 66 PUB. ADMIN. 239 (1988).
191. The discussion draws on Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer,
Persuasion in Politics, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 435, 435-37 (2004) (Papers &
Proceedings).
192. See Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and
Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market, in IDEAS
AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 173, 176
(Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).
193. Id. at 205.
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high stakes, it is unsurprising that the politics failed to work out for
the proponents.
Significantly, both paradigms did better in the courts. There,
given interpretive slack, network members in positions of authority
can find room to maneuver. At the same time, the judicial rulings
show us the only points in the sequence of events implying that
respect for the states operates as an independent and causative
value. There may have been members of the CTS Court who
preferred the market for corporate control and economic federalism
as a policy proposition but who also felt bound by a conflicting
juridical tradition of reserve, here bound up in the internal affairs
194
notion.
b. Parallel Politics. Alternatively, we can read these events
as a product of parallel normative views at the state and federal
levels. On this view, no federal intervention occurred because actors
controlling federal outcomes saw nothing amiss in state corporate
law. This view can be restated in public choice form: whether or not
most federal actors approved of state results, the federal interest
195
group gestalt paralleled that of the states, with the management
interest proving sufficiently dominant to protect the state regime.
An astute federal actor would anticipate an all out interest group
assault on any legislation that threatened the state equilibrium.
Management and related interest groups like the corporate bar and
the financial intermediaries have a significant investment in
Delaware law. Quite apart from any policy preferences, such
investors can be expected to fight (or pay) to protect the yield from
196
their sunk costs, and federal politicians can be expected to settle
in their favor, perhaps exacting tribute.
c.
Federalism. Finally, it remains possible that independent
federalism considerations operated to deter federal intervention.
The operative federalism notions could have been either juridical or
194. It should be noted that Justice Powell opposed takeovers and wanted
the states to be left free to contain them. See Pritchard, supra note 185, at 90520.
195. See Romano, supra note 108, at 475-76 (suggesting that federal- and
state-level takeover politics paralleled one another).
196. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the
Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of
Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 274-75, 278 (1990). Macey predicts that so long
as existing state rents are greater than the rents created by federal regulation,
the beneficiaries will pay Congress in return for retention of state control. Id.
at 276; see also Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the
Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 117 (1987) (showing that
where private parties have created quasi rents through capital investment,
politicians can extract payments in exchange for promising not to regulate).
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economic. We prefer an economic reading. The next sections of this
Part look at a number of high profile cases where Congress did cross
the internal affairs line, suggesting that any barrier posed by
constitutional traditions yields easily. As to economic notions of
federalism, a different inference arises. None of these incursions on
internal affairs have disrupted the state equilibrium, permitting an
inference of respect for state control over internal affairs, viewed
from an economic perspective.
B. Federal Incursions on Internal Affairs Under the Governance
Agenda
In 1934, William O. Douglas, then still a Yale law professor,
published an article in the Harvard Law Review in which he
described the shortcomings of the about-to-be enacted federal
197
securities statute. He noted scandals that had come to light in the
aftermath of the great crash, variously involving secret loans,
undisclosed profit sharing plans, self-dealing contracts, and insider
198
trading. Disclosure would not be enough, he said, more in the way
of regulation was needed to prevent the repeat of such sorry
199
spectacles in the next cyclical market rise.
The problem, said
200
Douglas, lay in the separation of ownership and control.
Taking
201
care to endorse the trust paradigm, he nevertheless articulated a
second agenda. Control of the board of directors needed to be taken
out of management’s hands and placed in those of an independent
director majority. He proposed a monitoring model—a board made
up of independent shareholder representatives who supervised from
202
a position of power.
Douglas also wanted more disclosure of
conflict of interest transactions and maybe even a per se prohibition
203
of loans to officers.
Finally, Douglas noted that the present legal
structure did little to move corporate governance in the direction
indicated. He was flexible about means to the end of improvement.
Any of federal incorporation, self-help by the shareholders (given a
federally instituted organizational base on which to solve collective
action problems), or improvement of state law might move things in

197. William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1305, 1306-07 (1934) [hereinafter Douglas, Directors]; see also William O.
Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 529 (1934).
198. Douglas, Directors, supra note 197, at 1306.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1306-07.
201. Id. at 1323.
202. Id. at 1314-16. In a later address he would add that boards should be
smaller, salaries should be adequate, and outsider directors should acquire a
thorough knowledge of the firm. SELIGMAN, supra note 54, at 207.
203. Douglas, Directors, supra note 197, at 1323-25.
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204

the right direction.
Douglas’ article set out the basic terms of the governance
205
agenda that has guided corporate law reform ever since.
Where
both the trust and the market paradigms have failed, this academic
paradigm has influenced both actors in the corporate sector and
federal legislators. Significantly, the agenda is narrow, viewed in
the broad scale of things, addressing only the managementshareholder relationship and eschewing other constituents and
unrelated notions of the public interest. It has two branches. The
first branch goes to the board of directors’ make-up and institutional
role. Here, two categories of questions come up. The first goes to
the identification of best corporate governance practices. The second
concerns whether a best practice, once identified, should be
mandated, overriding the enabling state system. The agenda’s
second branch concerns compliance with law. This branch in part
tracks state corporate law, looking to enforcement of fiduciary
duties. But the compliance agenda has an independent federal side
tied to the federal antifraud enforcement regime. This will be the
point of entry against state control of internal affairs.
The rest of this Part II.B recounts the appearance of the two
statutes that do most to carry the governance agenda across the
internal affairs barrier, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
206
207
(“FCPA”) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).
We will
see that the Congress traverses internal affairs on a fire patrol
208
basis. In both cases, a bipartisan Congress acted in response to an
external shock. In both cases, the state equilibrium precluded
significant corrective action. In both cases, corporate compliance
failures triggered broad-based political demands. And in both cases,
the federal compliance regime reached more deeply into internal
affairs.
1.

The Watergate Era

During the Watergate investigations of 1973-74, the special
prosecutor discovered corporate political slush funds that evaded
204. Id. at 1329-30.
205. For a later, more thorough-going exposition of points on the agenda, see
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS 137-211, 316-20 (1976).
206. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§
13(b)(2), 30A, 32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78dd-1-2, 78ff (2000)).
207. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2002)).
208. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI.
165, 166 (1984).
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209

Payments included illegal domestic
normal accounting controls.
political contributions and bribes to officials abroad—termed
“questionable foreign payments”—made in connection with the sale
210
of American goods and services.
In March 1974, the SEC
announced a voluntary disclosure program, asking companies to
211
admit to any questionable payments to foreign officials.
There
resulted admissions by over 450 companies implicating over $400
212
million in payments.
The public, already disgusted with
corruption in government and agitated by the media, demanded a
213
clean up of corruption in corporate America.
Corporate
governance became bound up with the politics of corruption in high
214
places.
The SEC responded in 1977, taking up governance agenda
items looking toward majority independent boards and committees.
It held public hearings. But, unfortunately, the SEC had no
statutory authorization to mandate committee structure. Aside
215
from section 14 of the 1934 Act, which authorizes the SEC proxy
rules, the agency could only mandate disclosure. So the SEC
worked the agenda into new disclosure rules concerning board and
committee membership and structure. It wanted each director
tagged as independent or affiliated. Management, however, made
its voice heard and the SEC had to settle for less direct means of
216
getting pertinent facts into the public filings.
Movement toward
board and committee process mandates shifted over to the American
Law Institute (“ALI”), which was taking up a corporate governance
project. But management was so averse to mandates that it raised
its voice at the ALI as well, stifling even a mandatory statement
217
encapsulated in a nonbinding principle.
Efficiency worries had
209. See GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 17 (1982).
210. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas –
The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate
Governance 10 (Social Science Research Network, Research Paper No. 7, 2004).
211. Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a
Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185, 187-88 (1994).
212. Id. The lead item was the revelation of twenty-two million dollars of
bribes abroad by Lockheed Aircraft. DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A GUIDE FOR U.S. FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE 5 (2d ed. 1999).
213. Id.
214. Schwartz, supra note 170, at 549.
215. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000).
216. Karmel, supra note 210, at 12-13.
217. Mandatory independent board structure was proposed in the first draft
of the American Law Institute’s Corporate Governance Project, but was cut back
to precatory status in later versions. Compare PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
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come to the fore in the stagflating economy. The governance agenda
was remitted to the less threatening venue of self-regulation, where
it prospered.
But a handful of mandates were forthcoming. The SEC
pressured the NYSE to amend its rules to require an audit
218
committee comprised solely of independent directors.
Putting the
proxy rules to one side, this amounted to the first national-level
mandatory push into internal affairs pursuant to the governance
agenda.
Additional mandates came with the FCPA, which prohibited
bribery of foreign officials, making the “questionable” payments
illegal. More importantly for present purposes, it amended the 1934
Act to go deeply into internal affairs, imposing record-keeping and
219
internal-control requirements on reporting firms.
The FCPA also
gave the SEC oversight over the formulation of accounting
220
principles.
It was said to amount to the most extensive
application of federal law to the regulation of corporations since
221
1934.
The FCPA’s mandates would have been inconceivable in the
state law framework. The stable equilibrium, with its enabling
approach, excluded them. Compliance systems were not even on the
states’ formal enabling menu. In theory compliance with the law fell
within the regime of fiduciary review; in practice there was no
222
enforcement commitment.
The FCPA grew out of a presidential investigation and spate of
223
committee hearings conducted in 1976, an election year.
There
was significant political disagreement. The Ford Administration
backed a disclosure-based statute; Democratic senators and their
GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.03 (T.D.
No. 1 1982) (recommending mandatory majority of independent directors), with
THE AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01 (1994) (suggesting having a majority of independent
directors). See also MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS 170-85 (1976) (recommending mandate). For a discussion of
the politics of the ALI proceedings, see Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation
of the American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1212 (1993).
218. Karmel, supra note 210, at 17.
219. See Walter Perkel, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
683, 683 (2003).
220. Id.
221. See GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 209, at 1.
222. The classic citation is Graham v. Allis Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125, 129-30
(Del. 1963) (declining duty of care review of antitrust compliance breakdown).
See generally Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the
Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1384 (1998).
223. GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 209, at 1.
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presidential candidate, Governor Jimmy Carter, wanted directives
and criminal penalties. The Senate unanimously passed a weak bill
before the election, but the House recessed before taking up the
224
matter.
When the new Congress convened in 1977, Carter had
won and the new administration backed a strong bill. The strong
225
version passed unanimously by the end of the year. As Figure IV
shows, the scandals unfolded against the backdrop of a volatile stock
market in which long-term investors made no money. The market
crashed during the Nixon-Ford administrations to recover in the
226
run-up to the 1976 election.
But, given the high inflation of the
period, the recovery did not make whole the losses. As Congress
finally took up the FCPA in 1977, the market again stumbled
227
badly.
Figure IV: Market Context 1972-78
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2.

The Enron Era

The scenario acted out in the mid-1970s repeated in 2002 in the
wake of reporting failures at Enron, WorldCom, and other firms.
Three ingredients once again combined: a major and ongoing decline
in the equity markets (depicted in Figure V), headline-grabbing
stories of corporate corruption, and popular anger towards corporate
management.
Once again, legislation intended to rein in
corporations passed with bipartisan support. Once again, internal
affairs were traversed without apparent concern for the federalism

224. Id. at 60-65.
225. Id. at 63, 71; Daniel L. Goelzer, The Accounting Provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act – The Federalization of Corporate Recordkeeping
and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP. L. 1, 17-18 (1979).
226. GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 209, at 1.
227. Id. at 59-74.
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228

norm. The result was SOX.
SOX had a quick gestation.
The Enron scandal and
accompanying media frenzy began with news of paper shredding in
January 2002. The House enacted its bill in April, by a vote of 334
229
to 80. WorldCom fell while the Senate held hearings on the House
bill, triggering an accelerated timetable and passage by voice vote on
230
July 15.
The Conference Report, passage by both Houses, and
231
presidential approval all followed before the end of the month.
The Republicans disliked many provisions, but with an election
coming up and a falling stock market (coming on the heels of a
precipitous plummet two years earlier), they fell in line. Even the
leading business lobbies were split, with the Business Roundtable
232
saying yes and the Chamber of Commerce saying no.
So rapidly
was the package cobbled together that little of its contents received
233
much in the way of considered attention.

228. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2000)).
229. See Report on Public Law 107-204, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03763:@@@R (last visited August 30, 2006).
230. Id.
231. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1600-02 (2005).
232. Id. at 112.
233. Id. at 111, 125. Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1998),
is the leading discussion of the politics that follow upon economic adversity. On
the recent scandals, see Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the
Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 1
(2002) (analogizing the development of the securities laws to the “punctuated
equilibrium” theory of evolution in which “species are relatively stable over long
periods of time, but ‘events of rapid speciation occasionally punctuate this
tranquility’”); Kai-Alexander Heeren & Oliver Rieckers, Legislative Responses
in Times of Financial Crisis – New Deal Securities Legislation, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and Their Impact on Future German and EU Regulation, 14 EUR. BUS. L.
REV. 595, 623 (2003) (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley’s purpose was to calm
investors by demonstrating congressional activism); Vikramaditya S. Khanna,
Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
95, 105 (2004) (describing corporate crime legislation as normally coming after
a public outcry for greater regulation following revelations of corporate
wrongdoing, usually during a weak economy).
Gregory Mark offers a
contrasting description, distinguishing between the economic downturn and the
scandals and putting causal emphasis on the former. See Gregory A. Mark, The
Legal History of Corporate Scandal: Some Observations on the Ancestry and
Significance of the Enron Era, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1073, 1086 (2003) (suggesting
that corporate reforms since the Great Depression have been ill-conceived).
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Figure V: Market Context 1999-2002

12,000
2/14/02
Legislation
Referred to House

11,500

4/24/02
Legislation
Passed by House
7/30/02
President Signs
Sarbanes -Oxley
Into Law

11,000
Dow 10,500
Jones
Ind. Avg. 10,000

9/11/01
Terrorist
Attacks

9,500
9,000
12/01 Enron
Declares
Bankruptcy

8,500

7/15/02
Senate
Passes
Legislation

8,000
1/99

3/99

5/99 7/99 9/99 11/99 1/00

3/00 5/00 7/00 9/00 11/00 1/01 3/01 5/01

7/01

9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02

Some of the SOX mandates pick up where the FCPA left off.
For example, SOX requires that the CEO and CFO certify public
reports, making them responsible for the maintenance of the firm’s
234
internal controls system,
along with accompanying criminal
235
penalties.
While these go to internal affairs, the affairs they
address have long been federalized. Moreover, the integrity of the
disclosure system still stands out as the ultimate goal. In effect, the
federal government, having instituted the mandatory system, reacts
to successive compliance failures by reaching further and further
back to cover the internal processes that generate the mandated
reports. The federal political response resembles that seen with
other regulatory regimes implicating criminal penalties: high profile
noncompliance triggers a ratcheting up of duties and penalties,
236
symbolically reassuring the public.
No one in Congress wants to
be seen as soft on crime, of whatever variety.
SOX also traverses internal affairs in regulating auditor-client
237
relationships, forbidding a list of nonaudit services. But here also
the territory had already been federalized; the list of nonaudit
238
services merely tracks a list already instituted by SEC rule.
The
234. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 302
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2002)).
235. Id. § 906(a) (enumerating penalties for knowing violation of similar
certification requirement); see Lisa M. Fairfax, Form over Substance?: Officer
Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 63 (2002).
236. See Brian T. FitzPatrick, Congressional Re-election Through Symbolic
Politics: The Enhanced Banking Crime Penalties, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3, 28
(1994) (discussing the response to the banking scandals of the late 1980s).
237. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201.
238. See Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements,
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new audit oversight board instituted by the statute tracks
regulatory templates already established for regulation of securities
market professionals.
Federally speaking, SOX shocks in requiring audit committees
composed entirely of independent directors, defining “independent
director,” laying down audit committee duties and powers, and
requiring disclosure respecting the expert status of committee
239
members.
The shock does not follow from the regulation’s terms.
240
The committee-based governance agenda dates back to Douglas.
The same goes for the other headline internal affairs item in SOX—
241
the ban on corporate loans to officers and directors.
When
242
Douglas mentioned this ban in 1934, he was only restating a
suggestion made many times in the early decades of the twentieth
243
century.
SOX, then, is an ideal manifestation of Kingdon’s model
of a law reform idea that sits at the bottom of agenda for decades,
waiting for a window of political opportunity to open and a
normative entrepreneur to put it at the right spot on the agenda at
244
that time.
It also can be noted that SOX’s transformation of self-regulatory
process devices into mandates implies little in the way of real-world
institutional adjustment. Most large firms were organized with
audit committees and compliance systems already, reflecting the
influence of decades of self-regulatory conversations about bestgovernance practices. National-level audit committee mandates
date from the Watergate era, albeit through the medium of
exchange-listing requirements.
Indeed, amendments to NYSE
listing requirements mooted in 2002 and approved in 2004 track the
SOX audit committee provisions and extend them to the
compensation and nominating committees before going on to the
final redoubt of the boardroom to mandate a majority-independent
245
board.
The stock exchange remains the primary source of new
mandates from the governance agenda.
The Congress’s off-handed but emphatic revision of the internal

65 Fed. Reg. 76,008-01 (2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01, 240.14e-101
(2006)).
239. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 301, 407.
240. See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
241. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402(a).
242. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers: Every
Business Now a Bank?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 237, 241-42.
243. See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
244. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 216
(1984). See generally Romano, supra note 231.
245. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A (2003), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf.
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affairs line drawn after 1934 does upset settled expectations. The
present question is whether it implies anything further for corporate
federalism. In addressing this question, we put standard cost247
benefit criticisms of SOX off to one side to look at the political
pattern. FCPA and SOX have sufficient similarities to suggest a
template for federal traversals of internal affairs. First, both
statutes respond to compliance failures by pushing federal
regulation past the end product, the reports themselves, to the
generative processes. Both concern compliance with law (or in the
case of “questionable payments,” quasi law), and respond to political
demands appearing in the wake of high-profile noncompliance. In
both cases, the political demands could not have been satisfied at
the state level, partly due to dispersion of response across fifty
states and partly due to the stable equilibrium. Meanwhile, in both
cases, the political demand stemmed from the general public, rather
than from organized interest groups. (We think that the interest
groups benefited, lawyers and accountants primarily, amount to
incidental beneficiaries rather than prime movers.) Both statutes
draw on a nonideological source, the governance agenda, and
surmounted partisan politics in the course of their enactment.
Finally, neither statute appears to have disturbed the state
equilibrium. Isolated mandates from the governance agenda do not
amount to external shocks that force strategies to change at the
state level. They apply across the board, putting no competitive
pressure on Delaware.
Because they supplement the states’
enabling framework, no state-level adjustment is necessary. It is
management that has to adjust. Congress intervenes against
management, not Delaware.
SOX also demonstrates the political implications of the rise of
248
the shareholder class. As the shareholder class rises, sharp stock
market reverses and concomitant corporate misdeeds are more
likely to hold out national political ramifications. Significantly,
federalism concerns did show up prominently in the history of the
FCPA—the Ford administration wanted to respect the post-1934
internal affairs boundary. But with SOX twenty-five years later,
federalism concerns did nothing to deter either the Congress or the
246. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of
Corporate Law, 26 REG. 26, 26-31 (2003).
247. The complaint is that SOX raises compliance costs more than more
compliance benefits firms and shareholders. In particular, the costs bear more
heavily on a marginal class of firms that will be discouraged from going public
or, if already public, might be forced to go private. In addition, foreign listings
may be deterred.
248. For a description, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End
of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 452-53 (2001).
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Republican administration. The political demands, or at least
Washington’s perception of them, seem to have materially increased
in magnitude. So, to the extent Delaware’s management customers
continue to behave badly, it can expect the zone of federal mandate
to continue to expand. When this happens Delaware should blame
its customers rather than the Congress, which is only responding to
highly representative politics.
Delaware does run a risk here. Future cumulative SOX-type
mandates could so hardwire governance processes that firms decide
that the choice of state of incorporation is irrelevant and stop paying
Delaware’s premium price.
This seems a low-probability
contingency, however.
Although the enabling code is a core
component of the state equilibrium, it is not something Delaware
sells today. Most of the state codes converged on key equilibrium
terms decades ago.
C.

Federal Incursions on Internal Affairs at Management’s Request

We complete the post-1934 description of federal traversal of
state territory with reference to three interventions originating in
249
management demands. The Williams Act of 1968, the National
250
Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”), and the
251
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”).
All three pieces of legislation stem from management dissatisfaction
with the state system. All three were enacted in rising stock
markets.
None of the three disturbed the charter market
equilibrium, with which management presumably had no
dissatisfaction.
1.

The Williams Act

The Williams Act imposes, inter alia, disclosure and process
constraints on tender offerors and target companies. It modifies
what previously had been a state-law zone of free contract between
arm’s length buyers and sellers of shares. The Act reduces the
contracting space with process constraints on the conduct of tender
offers. It should be described as management protective: its
minimum duration period strengthens the hand of target
management, importing a window of opportunity in which to employ

249. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2000)).
250. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 112 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. (2000)).
251. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. (2000)).
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252

defensive tactics.
The Act stemmed from concern over the increasing impact of
“corporate raiders,” and was conceived as a device to curb cash
253
tender offers.
Senator Harrison Williams introduced the
254
legislation in 1965,
making clear his management-protective
motive, speaking of “white collar pirates” who took advantage of the
255
“leniency of our laws” to loot “proud old companies.”
But
Williams’s pro-management draft failed to attract support from the
256
SEC and therefore failed to gain traction in the Senate.
Then, as
later, views on takeovers conflicted.
257
Williams tried again in 1967, with a less stringent draft. This
time he emphasized that the bill was not meant to discourage tender
258
offers per se. Reflecting the view of SEC Chairman Cohen,
Williams assured that the bill was neutral towards both bidders and
259
targets.
In this case narrow policy networks had an impact: the
final Act’s modest compass stemmed in no small part from
suggestions of the securities industry and academics, who took the
260
261
bidder’s part. With support secured from the SEC and the stock
262
exchanges, the bill passed easily, by a series of voice votes.
252. David D. Haddock, et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to
Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701, 741 (1987); see also Jonathan R. Macey &
Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65 WASH. U. L.Q.
131, 157-58 (1987) (arguing that rules requiring disclosure of bidders’ intentions
serve no public interest, benefiting lawyers, accountants, and investment
bankers in addition to defending managers).
253. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1891 (1989).
254. Id.
255. RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., TAKEOVERS II: A STRATEGIST’S MANUAL FOR
BUSINESS COMBINATIONS IN THE 1990S 8 (2d ed. 1993).
256. Johnson & Millon, supra note 253, at 1891.
257. The Williams Act, as eventually passed, had reduced proration periods
and limited withdrawal periods compared to those initially considered. See
Note, SEC Tender Offer Timing Rules: Upsetting a Congressionally Selected
Balance, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 914, 925 (1983); see also Johnson & Millon, supra
note 253, at 1893 (describing the Act as a compromise between pro and
antitakeover views).
258. Note, supra note 257, at 925.
259. See Allen E. Kelinsky, Comment, Tender Offers: Promoting Shareholder
Equality in Stock Accumulation Programs for Corporate Control, 36 AM. U. L.
REV. 93, 94-95 (1986).
260. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 253, at 1897; Note, supra note 257, at
926-27.
261. The SEC broadly accepted the Williams Act as passed due to its desire
for a bill that neither favored nor disfavored corporate takeover activity through
tender offers. See Richard W. Stevenson, Securities Bill Emerges in House as
G.O.P. Drops Some Demands, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at D1.
262. See 113 Cong. Rec. 24,664 (1967); 114 Cong. Rec. 21,483-84 (1968); 114
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Figure VI: Market Context 1964-68
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The stock market correlation is interesting. Figure VI shows
that Williams introduced the legislation at the height of the “go go”
years. The period of inactivity in the legislative history coincided
with a sharp downward correction. Then, the market having
recovered in part and with the shareholder interest better protected,
the bill finally passed.
2.

Securities and Litigation Reform

The NSMIA of 1996 preempts much of the parallel state system
of securities regulation, long called the “blue sky laws.” More
particularly, the NSMIA (1) preempts state-level merit review and
disclosure requirements for firms registered at the federal level,
federally registered investment companies, and most private
264
placements; (2) preempts much state-level regulation of broker265
dealers;
and (3) provides for exclusive federal regulation of
advisors to federally registered investment companies and other
266
advisors with large portfolios.
Thus constituted, the statute
harmonizes and streamlines securities regulation. It does not
traverse internal affairs, narrowly defined. Nor does it disturb the
charter competition equilibrium: the blue sky laws apply to offers
and sales of securities within each state, regardless of the issuer’s
domicile.

Cong. Rec. 21,954 (1968).
263. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (graph developed using the
opening level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the first trading day of
each month over the course of the cycle).
264. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000).
265. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(h)(1) (2000).
266. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000).
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Figure VII: Market Context 1994-98
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The Act originated on the Republican side as a deregulatory
268
initiative.
The Democrats and the SEC both complained that it
went too far in reducing protections for shareholders. The sponsors
269
promptly dropped the most far-reaching proposals.
Thereafter,
the bill garnered bipartisan support, passing the House by a 407-to270
271
8 vote and the Senate by a voice vote.
President Clinton made
272
no objection.
As Figure VII shows, the stock market was rising
throughout the sequence of events.
The SLUSA was drafted to cover a perceived loophole in the
273
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
Forum shopping
was alleged—plaintiffs were bringing securities fraud class actions
274
in state court, avoiding new federal-level process strictures.
The
267. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (graph developed using the
opening level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the first trading day of
each month over the course of the cycle).
268. See Stevenson, supra note 261, at D1.
269. Id. These included provisions that would have impaired the states’
ability to regulate small cap companies and otherwise enforce their laws. See
id. at D1.
270. See Report on Pub. L. 104-290, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d104:HR03005:@@@XlTOM:/bss/d104query.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).
271. Securities Regulation Bill Is Cleared By Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
1996, at 34.
272. See
Report on
Pub.
L.
104-290,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d104:SN01815:@@@X (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).
273. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (amending scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (2000)).
274. See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal
Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2,
4 (1998).
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bill limited both state-level class actions and fraud actions based on
275
state law.
In 1997, the bill was reported out on a bipartisan basis in both
the House and the Senate. SEC Chair Arthur Levitt and Senator
Paul Sarbanes both voiced opposition at hearings, and the matter
276
stalled for a few months.
In 1998, the legislation moved forward
with renewed vigor, due in no small part to the steadily rising stock
277
market and the increasing political muscle of Silicon Valley.
High-tech companies and other corporations interested in pursuing
278
the new legislation created a lobbying group for the occasion,
which was joined by the National Venture Capital Association, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the
279
American Electronics Association.
Several organizations,
including some consumer groups and organizations representing
state and local governments, lobbied against the bill, but they lacked
280
the political muscle of their opponents.
But then, the stock
281
market was going through the roof, as Figure VII attests.
Silicon Valley got what it wanted. Levitt and President Clinton
dropped their opposition in exchange for legislative history making
it clear that no prohibition of federal suits for recklessness was
282
intended.
Although there were significant numbers of dissenters
in both houses, the bill went through with strong majorities. But
before passage, a Delaware-oriented carve-out was added in the
Senate, assuring that state litigation with respect to breach of
283
fiduciary duty would be unaffected.

275. Delaware was not a target: under prevailing conflict of laws rules, the
fraud actions are not decided under the law of the state of incorporation. See
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2402-12 (1998).
276. In mid-1997 there were many who questioned the need for a uniform
standards act for securities litigation. In hearings, SEC Chair Levitt declared
that it was still too early to assess whether or not a uniform act was needed;
several senators, led by Senator Sarbanes, agreed with this assessment. See
Eugene P. Caiola, Comment, Retroactive Legislative History: Scienter Under the
Uniform Security Litigation Standards Act of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REV. 309, 337
(2000). The SLUSA thereafter stalled due to a lack of support. Id. at 340.
277. See Leslie Eaton, The Silicon Valley Gang: An Influential Industry with
Lots of Money Is Getting Its Way on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at
D1.
278. Matthew Greco, Pre-emptive Legislation Expected Soon, INVESTOR REL.
BUS., May 5, 1997.
279. Painter, supra note 274, at 49.
280. Id. at 50.
281. Figure VII, supra at note 267.
282. Painter, supra note 274, at 7, 53.
283. Id. at 56.
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Summary

Douglas astutely predicted in 1934 that scandals stemming
from management shenanigans in bull markets were going to
284
remain a problem.
The FCPA and SOX fulfilled the prediction,
both responding to political demands for management accountability
in the wake of scandals. In the case of the FCPA, the public
responded to the scandal in the mode of the trust paradigm, casting
managers as public actors. Power meant responsibility. Corruption
was unacceptable, even corruption in pursuit of shareholder value.
285
With the public proving willing to pay for ethical behavior,
Congress moved to impose responsibility in law. In contrast, Enron,
WorldCom, and SOX were shareholder-value centered. Managers
whose stocks had collapsed had failed to comply with law, with the
compliance failure bound up with the losses of many investors.
Congress felt compelled to toughen the compliance regime.
The broad-based political demands that led to FCPA and SOX
occur only rarely. For the public to have an opinion, it first has to be
286
informed and then has to deliberate.
This rarely occurs on
corporate governance matters, particularly so as to register political
287
demands so strong as to surmount ideological divisions.
Retail
investors, viewed as an interest group, have little political
288
influence. But well-publicized corruption and noncompliance raise
289
the specter of a median voter interest in corporate matters and
thereby bring about the exceptional case. Stock market reverses
also figure in. When stocks are rising, people tend not to worry
about compliance and politicians are loath to rock the boat. Given
284. Douglas, Directors, supra note 197, at 1306.
285. See Andrei Shleifer, Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?, 94
AM. ECON. REV. 414, 418 (2004) (papers & proceedings) (noting that as societies
grow rich they prove more willing to pay for ethical behavior through
enforcement).
286. SMITH, supra note 165, at 28.
287. FCPA and SOX thus can be distinguished from what Smith terms
“unifying issues”—issues that unite all business interests. According to Smith,
as to such issues, ideological divisions matter and partisan politics make the
issues visible. SMITH, supra note 165, at 25-26. Success on such issues
correlates with national political shifts, with business doing better in the early
1950s, the early 1980s, and the mid-1990s. Id. at 85.
288. See Donald C. Langevoort, Structuring Securities Regulation in the
European Union: Lessons from the U.S. Experience 10-11 (European Corporate
Governance Inst., working paper No. 41/2005, 2005).
289. One-third of American voters now describe themselves as “investors,”
and national politicians now cater to the so-called “investor class.” See Richard
S. Dunham & Ann Therese, Just Who’s in the ‘Investor Class’?: A Third of the
Country, and Growing. No Wonder Bush is Wooding Them so Ardently, BUS.
WK., Sept. 6, 2004, at 42-43.
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market volatility due to noise trading and a widening pattern of
equity investment, we can expect to see more such national political
demands in the wake of compliance breakdowns.
FCPA and SOX reflect a cooperative strategy as they respond to
the demands. Neither significantly disrupts the post-1934 division
of subject matter between national and state levels. They do
traverse internal affairs. But they do so largely toward the end of
strengthening compliance with law, and the law in question, for the
most part, is federal. The entries onto state territory occur as
incidents to the federal government’s maintenance of the integrity of
its own system, and the federal system in the first instance remains
directed to the national securities marketplace. Nor do the FCPA
and SOX appear to have disrupted the state-level equilibrium.
Viewed from an economic perspective, then, they substantially
respect the state system. The issue with SOX is not federalism but
costs and benefits at the national level.
Even when SOX breaks a historic federal-state subject-matter
pattern with its audit committee mandate, it only tracks more
extensive mandatory interventions coming from the stock exchange
acting independently. Only the per se rule on loans to officers
arguably takes SOX outside the national level box onto state
fiduciary territory. But, in fact, executive compensation has always
been a federal topic, with a strong interest in the matter reflected in
the insider-trading regime. In any event, federalization of conflictof-interest transactions has a long way to go before it materially
impacts the states. There is no risk of that happening in the present
context. Indeed, with SLUSA, we saw the Congress take special
care to avoid impairment of Delaware’s litigation business. With
FCPA and SOX, the loser is not Delaware, but management, which
290
loses freedom of action in the shift from enabling to mandatory.
We conclude, then, that FCPA and SOX do not significantly
violate or reconstitute prevailing federalism norms. Instead, they
follow from a political equilibrium within which federal and state
regulatory authority has been allocated for more than a century.
Recall that, under the state equilibrium, corporate law responds
directly to the demands of corporate principals and agents acting
within their corporate capacities, with the system positioning the
dominant chartering state’s law to apply across the wider national
political and economic geography. The equilibrium holds out a
possibility of externalities, particularly to the extent that agent
demands register more loudly than those of the principals. The
states’ stable strategy also makes them unresponsive when national
political demands concerning compliance arise in the wake of
290. Whether the shareholders won or lost is an open cost-benefit question.

676

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

external shocks. Any response must be national.
If Delaware were to shift strategies and compete with the SEC
in taking the shareholders’ part on matters such as voting rights
and rights of initiative, the shift would be viewed as a defection
against the management interest and would disrupt the
equilibrium. The same is true of the public interest in compliance
with law. Delaware has never and cannot take the public’s part on
matters of executive compliance with law and ex post punishment.
Delaware does not criminalize; it neither jails nor fines. We do get
291
rhetoric from Delaware on the importance of compliance.
But we
have not seen Delaware apply its duty of care so that directors of
firms with compliance breakdowns are required to pay money
judgments. We are highly unlikely ever to do so. There is no
strategy available to Delaware that lets it protect its interest in
subject-matter territory by anticipating federal intervention and
292
addressing and defusing the federal concern.
FCPA and SOX show us the federal strategy followed when
political demands flow against management. The Williams Act,
NSMIA, and SLUSA show us a different class of federal play, the
play that follows from the same sort of influence activity that
determines results in the states. Here, the general public has no
knowledge of, and hence no opinion on, the subject matter. The
issues are what Mark Smith calls particularistic, that is, reflecting
the interests of one business interest group, or conflictual, that is,
293
triggering a difference of opinion within the business community.
Here, Democratic and Republican positions often blend into one
294
another and elective politics have no direct bearing.
Interest
group influence tends to register more directly, giving management
the same advantage at the federal level that it enjoys in the states.
As at the state level, such management political operations tend to
succeed against the backdrop of strong stock markets. But the
federal-state political overlap is not complete. The difference lies in
the SEC, which skews the federal agenda to weight the shareholder
interest more heavily than the shareholder interest is or could be
291. See In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-70
(Del. Ch. 1996).
292. The embeddedness point can be restated in terms of vetoes. In
Delaware, management, along with the state bar, acts as a veto player. The
larger the number of veto players in a lawmaking institution, the more policy
becomes locked in and the more serious the status quo bias in the face of
adverse shocks. Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey D. Sachs, Political and Economic
Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies, 33 EUR. ECON.
REV. 903 (1989).
293. SMITH, supra note 165, at 21.
294. Id. at 24, 31.
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weighted at the state level under the stable equilibrium.
III. DELAWARE

Delaware’s competitive position gets stronger all the time. We
have seen that its market share has increased steadily since its 1967
code revision. Delaware has done equally well by other measures.
Major reincorporations to Delaware peaked at the height of the
296
takeover wars of the 1980s, with fifty-six in 1987.
The numbers
fell
thereafter,
but
remained
steady—there
were
208
297
reincorporations between 1991 and 2001.
In 1983, the total
number of firms chartered in Delaware was 153,044; in 1990, the
figure was 202,893, and by 2000, the figure had grown to 322,971 to
298
fall off slightly in the recession years that followed. Table I shows
that revenues from franchise taxes and corporation fees, taken as a
percentage of all state revenues, a historically volatile figure,
regained the twenty percent level in 1992 and hovered around
twenty percent ever since.
Table I: Revenues from Franchise Taxes and Corporation
299
Fees as a Percent of all Revenues in Delaware
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
16.2% 15.3% 17.3% 14.4% 13.0% 12.1% 12.2% 12.2% 12.2%
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
11.9% 12.0% 13.7% 14.8% 15.7% 17.6% 17.4% 17.1% 17.5%
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
22.9% 21.3% 20.8% 20.4% 21.0% 21.8% 21.1% 21.2% 22.8%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
24.9% 22.1% 20.0% 20.8% 19.6%

295. See Langevoort, supra note 288, at 10-12, 14 (describing the culture of
the SEC and rejecting a regulatory capture description).
296. Demetrios G. Kaouris, Note, Is Delaware Still a Haven for
Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 1012 tbl.1 (1995).
297. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on
Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover
Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1821 tbl.1 (2002).
298. Email from Richard J. Geisenberger, Assistant Secretary of State, State
of Delaware to author (June 25, 2004) (on file with author).
299. Id. Table 1 picks up where the figures in NADER, ET AL., supra note 19,
at 535 tbl.2, leave off, bringing the data to date.
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In this Part we look at Delaware’s evolution in the wake of the
federal incorporation threat of the 1970s and the takeover wars of
the 1980s, both of which destabilized the state equilibrium.
Delaware’s courts emerge as model strategic players. Given a threat
from a federal or state opponent, they pause between plays for
rational introspection and adjust their strategies for future rounds
of play. Even as they adjust, they tend to do everything possible to
leave the state equilibrium undisturbed. In only one case do we see
the judges experiment with a strategy that turns out to be
inconsistent with management’s equilibrium expectations. The
courts then learn from the mistake, successfully remaking
Delaware’s profile in an era obsessed with law compliance by
empowered actors.
In Part III.A, we show how Delaware’s bench dealt with the
federal incorporation threat by taking fiduciary law more seriously.
In so doing it experimented with and then rejected the trust
paradigm, with its template of fairness review. Drawing on the
governance agenda to substitute process scrutiny, the Delaware
courts reinvented corporate fiduciary law. Their new strategy
makes fiduciary review compatible with the management’s
preference for a self-regulatory approach. At the same time,
Delaware’s judges have emerged as leaders in ongoing discussions
about corporate best practices, strengthening the state’s tie to its
corporate constituents. Delaware emerges as a national leader, the
good corporate cop that contrasts with the federal bad cop. It should
follow, in the event of an external economic or political shock that
triggers questions about the charter system, that Delaware has a
powerful base of support in Washington. As a result, the federalstate equilibrium should remain relatively stable even as political
demands respecting governance continue to show up nationally.
Part III.B discusses Delaware’s takeover problem.
Here
Delaware dealt with incompatible demands: management wanted
antitakeover legislation and threatened to exit the state, while the
federal government threatened to intervene to protect takeovers.
Delaware responded by sticking with the evolutionarily stable
strategy and staring down the federal government. It made the
right political choice. The 1980s federal preemptive threat lacked
political credibility and would not have disrupted the state
equilibrium in any event.
Part III.C turns to Delaware in the era of shareholder
capitalism. Time has been on Delaware’s side. The federal
government has lost all interest in takeovers. And, even as
institutional shareholders remain dissatisfied with takeover
defenses, their complaints register only in a narrow network.
Ironically, their primary role at the state level has been to
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strengthen Delaware’s position in the charter market. Today, due to
the activist institutions, the shareholder veto on reincorporations
means more than in the past, making even less likely the emergence
of a competing state marketing a more management-favorable
product.
Part III.D concludes by asking whether it is helpful to analogize
Delaware to a federal administrative agency. The discussion admits
the power of the analogy, but questions whether it assists us at the
bottom line, where the question goes to the strength to be accorded
to the internal affairs presumption.
A.

Fiduciary Law

Rent extraction, when visible, can come at the cost of
300
diminished reputation.
Cary imposed that cost on the Delaware
courts when he accused them of monolithic support of management
301
rent seeking, citing a cluster of cases as evidence.
The Delaware
302
courts proved sensitive to Cary’s allegations of corruption,
becoming more noticeably responsive to the shareholder interest in
303
the three decades since 1974. Most of the cases Cary cited are no
304
longer good law.

300. PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 78, at 18.
301. Cary, supra note 93, at 673-98.
302. Id. at 684, 696-98.
303. For empirical confirmation, see Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy:
The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND.
L. REV. 85, 104-08 (1990). Branson’s study of Supreme Court cases decided
between 1974 and 1987 finds a larger number of proshareholder results than
promanagement results.
304. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964), a mainstay of management
takeover defensive practice, fell to Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (reversing Cheff and applying an expanded review
of tender offer defensive tactics under proportionality test) and Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (inventing
a duty of management defending tender offer to auction company in limited
circumstances), during the takeover wars of the 1980s. Graham v. AllisChalmers Manufacturing Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963), fell more recently,
untenable in light of a generation of contrary management practice under the
monitoring model of corporate governance. See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). A similar fate could be suggested for
Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970). See E. Norman
Veasey & William E. Manning, Codified Standard–Safe Harbor or Uncharted
Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared to Delaware
Law, 35 BUS. LAW. 919, 929-30 (1980) (discussing Graham). American
Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 136 A.2d 690, 694 (Del. 1957) (refusing
to enjoin a defensive shareholders meeting called on short notice or to act
respecting a proxy statement the court acknowledged to be incomplete) might
well come out differently today, given Unocal and other cases more closely
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The break with the past first manifested itself in 1977, when
305
Singer v. Magnavox Co. imposed strict fiduciary standards on
parent firms in cash out mergers. Singer is famous for having come
down just after the Supreme Court removed the threat of federal
preemption of state fiduciary rules under the antifraud rules of the
306
securities laws. The story told at the time was that the brush with
preemption at the hands of the federal judiciary and the critical
atmosphere provoked by Cary, Nader, and others prompted the
Delaware Supreme Court to reverse its direction so as to better
accommodate the interests of investors and thereby diminish the
possibility of future threats of intervention. Indeed, around the time
the case was decided in 1977, the SEC proposed a rule that required
substantive fairness in the class of transactions covered by the
307
case.
Delaware’s defensive adjustment yielded results in the
SEC’s rulemaking proceeding—the final rule promulgated two years
308
later dropped the fairness test and limited its reach to disclosure.
Thus did a federal threat impress upon the Delaware courts the
309
practical importance of solicitude to shareholder interests.
The post-Cary behavior pattern persisted as the courts
articulated unexpected new shareholder-protective applications of

scrutinizing management procedural manipulations and misrepresentations.
See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 653-58 (Del. Ch. 1988);
Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778 (Del. 1993) (confirming director duty of full
disclosure of shareholders in connection with merger). Two cases Cary cited,
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331, 339 (Del. 1940) (permitting
firms to use charter amendments effected through common shareholder voting
power to strip preferred stockholders of contract rights) and Hariton v. Arco
Electronics Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963) (extending the doctrine of
independent legal significance to mergers and acquisitions), are still good law,
but operate in a less relentlessly management-favorable context. A good faith
duty to preferred stockholders has been acknowledged. See, e.g., HB Korenvaes
Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,728 (Del. Ch. 1993),
and mergers are subject a more broad-ranging fiduciary scrutiny. Only Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971) (leaving burden of proof on
complaining minority shareholders), stands unqualified, and few today
complain about it.
305. 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
306. See supra text accompanying note 181. The case was Santa Fe
Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977).
307. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14185 (Nov. 17, 1977).
308. See Securities Act Release Nos. 6100, 6101 (Aug. 2 1979); Ralph C.
Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the
New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 272-73 n.49 (1980).
309. Note also that judicial reputations depend on comparisons with the
performance of judges on other courts, state and federal. Thus a critical
atmosphere can arouse reputational concerns even with a less immediate
federal threat.
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basic fiduciary rules.
The most famous examples concerned
310
takeovers—Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. and Revlon, Inc. v.
311
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. which established a regime
of fiduciary scrutiny of takeover defensive tactics. Friendly mergers
312
also came under scrutiny—Smith v. Van Gorkom and Cede & Co.
313
v. Technicolor, Inc.
surprised everyone with surprisingly
aggressive applications of the duty of care to board approvals of
proposed mergers.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC
314
Network Inc. later brought the takeover and the merger cases
together with a broadly phrased directive to managers under hostile
315
attack to enhance shareholder value.
But the pattern has been volatile. Equally famous cases restrict
the application of the new rules. In fact, the Singer rule did not last
long, being in turn rejected in 1983 for a looser, process-based
316
approach to cashout mergers in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.
Weinberger later was itself cut back, when short-form mergers were
317
excepted from the category subject to fiduciary scrutiny.
The
promises of Unocal and Revlon also went unfulfilled. Under Moran
318
v. Household International, Inc. and its progeny, the poison pill
319
remains a potent and largely unregulated defense.
In the eyes of
critical observers, Delaware’s cases amount to little more than a
conjuring trick. The courts garnered publicity in a handful of highly
310. 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (reversing Cheff and applying an
expanded review of tender offer defensive tactics under the proportionality
test).
311. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (inventing a duty of management
defending a tender offer to auction company in limited circumstances).
312. 488 A.2d 858, 873-81 (Del. 1985) (expanding the duty of care suddenly
to cover board approval of arm’s length merger).
313. 634 A.2d 345, 366-71 (Del. 1993) (applying a heightened duty of care
scrutiny of boardroom merger decision and suggesting an expanded remedial
concept inclusive of post-merger gain).
314. 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) (holding that management has an obligation
to achieve best value reasonably available for shareholders).
315. Less surprising but equally important is the recent invalidation of a
delayed-redemption poison pill in Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro,
721 A.2d 1281, 1293 (Del. 1998).
316. 457 A.2d 701, 704, 715 (Del. 1983) (overruling Singer in favor of less
restrictive process scrutiny of cash-out mergers).
317. See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 244 (Del.
2001).
318. 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985) (sustaining poison pill defense
under Unocal).
319. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-54
(Del. 1989), made this clear with its allowance of extraordinary latitude to
managers defending a tender offer that disrupts preexisting plans for a friendly
merger.
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publicized cases, ruling against management and announcing vague
standards that held out the prospect of shareholder value
enhancement. But in less well-publicized subsequent cases, they
used the camouflage of complex facts to refrain from applying the
320
standards in management-constraining ways.
The full set of
results tallied by the lawyers signaled considerably more room for
managerial maneuvering than did the public profile signaled by the
leading cases.
Whatever the merits of the cases’ holdings, Delaware’s judges
have transformed the state into a respectable lawmaker. This
partly results from the quality of the bench—even when ruling for
management in cases of palpable shareholder injury, its analyses
are thoughtful. The bench’s awareness of its national role also
figures in. As judges, they have an independent reputational
321
incentive to advocate for their system’s legitimacy.
They now
maintain a dialog on governance issues with the bar, financial
322
intermediaries, and academics.
Outsiders when Cary wrote, they
are now important players in the elite governance policy network.
They make a convincing case, explaining that they pursue the
state’s interest in balancing conflicting interest group demands,
acting in a meditative capacity. They take care to point out that
they not only mediate between management and shareholders, but
as also protect market risk-taking even as they impose ethical
323
constraints. It has become hard to imagine a bench that could do
a better job, given the constraints imposed by the state
324
equilibrium.

320. For a reading of the cases after Unocal along these lines, see VICTOR
BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON, BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN’S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 1087-95, 1129-30 (4th ed. 1993).
321. See Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 63, 72-74, 78-80 (1994) (offering a repeat game model of judicial
motivation showing that judges follow precedent if there is a self-enforcing
system based the need to uphold systemic legitimacy); see also Thomas J. Miceli
& Mertin M. Co gel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-making, 23 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 31, 44-49 (1994) (modeling the preferences of judges on a utility
function that includes both a private and a reputational component).
322. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Our Corporate Federalism and the
Shape of Corporate Law 31 (New York University Law School, Working Paper
No. 04-020, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=564685.
323. See Andrew G.T. Moore, II & Bayless Manning, State Competition:
Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 779, 779-800 (1987) (at the time Moore was
a Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court). They also have acknowledged the
federal threat. See William T. Quillen, The Federal-State Corporate Law
Relationship—A Response to Professor Seligman’s Call for Federal Preemption
of State Corporate Fiduciary Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 107, 129 (1993).
324. For a contrasting approbation of the Delaware courts, see Kahan &
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Two facets of the case law demonstrate the astuteness and
innovation that the Delaware bench brings to its mediations. The
first is the special committee of independent directors, which can be
325
traced to a footnote in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.
The predecessor
case, Singer, had effected Delaware’s fiduciary about-face,
employing substantive review directed to the fairness or unfairness
of the corporate action taken, very much in the mode of the trust
paradigm. Weinberger dropped that approach to draw instead on
the process-based governance agenda in scrutinizing transactions
impacting the rights of minority shareholders. The court held out
relaxed scrutiny, provided that a committee of independent directors
was constituted to negotiate on behalf of the minority. It was a
brilliant compromise: judicial scrutiny of the transaction still would
be necessary, but scrutiny would extend only to the conduct of the
constructed negotiation; this in turn obviated the need for direct,
mandatory review of the transaction. Process was better than
substance for two reasons: first, it diminished the likelihood of
judicial confrontation with the salient question of whether the
majority was robbing the minority; second, it avoided confrontation
with fact questions concerning the value of the firm. Since
Weinberger, the independent committee device has been widely
326
drawn on in Delaware fiduciary cases.
An additional, incidental
benefit has appeared over time. Issues about the composition of
special committees and their conduct of proceedings bring the
Delaware courts to the forefront of debates about corporate best
327
practices and the governance agenda.
The Delaware bench
emerges as a focal point in the self-regulatory discussion. This is
exactly the right strategy.
The second salient aspect of Delaware’s cases is the habit of
making normative pronouncements on a prospective basis and
avoiding imposition of damages. Delaware judges use their cases’
complex fact patterns to make moral pronouncements about
management behavior. The culpable manger is not, however,
necessarily hit with an injunction against his or her deal; a money
328
judgment is still less likely.
Instead, the court announces its
Rock, supra note 322, at 29 (comparing Delaware case law to nineteenthcentury jurisprudence and explaining that structural weakness causes
Delaware cases to take on a neutral, technocratic gloss).
325. 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983).
326. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del.
1994).
327. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 920 (Del.
Ch. 2003) (expounding on the meaning of directorial independence).
328. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1015, 1039 (1997). Although a money
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dissatisfaction with the manager’s conduct in the course of denying
an injunction against the transaction or dismissing the complaint.
It is the actor in the next deal who replicates the disapproved
329
conduct that faces a litigation risk. Edward Rock argues that this
works well: Delaware judges communicate normative standards to
the business community through a network of lawyers and
investment bankers.
Significantly, the resulting behavioral
330
deterrent is reputational rather than financial.
The Delaware courts learned to take this kid-gloves approach
the hard way. The Delaware Supreme Court’s innovative and
aggressive application of the duty of care in Smith v. Van Gorkum
did hold out an immediate prospect of a money judgment against
331
independent directors.
The result was nervousness in
boardrooms, a substantial increase in insurance premiums, and
much criticism of Delaware. The legislature had to intervene to
undo the result of the strategic misfire. Prompted by the corporate
committee of the state bar, it amended Delaware’s code to permit
332
firms to opt out of the duty of care by charter amendment.
The
courts would not make the same mistake again: we know of only one
case in the two decades since Van Gorkum in which a Delaware
333
court imposed a significant damage award on director defendants.
With this prospective, dialogic approach, the Delaware courts
break out of the conventional pattern of legislation and adjudication.
In the conventional set up, only the legislature acts prospectively;
common law is applied by judges on a present basis, even if the
ruling is unprecedented. The litigant who breaches an extant duty
on a new fact pattern loses the case and pays a judgment or has its
course of conduct enjoined. From an abstract perspective, it is hard
to see what makes corporate managers such delicate beings that
they require an exemption from the ordinary rules of the game. The
point must be that the exemption has been purchased, and
solicitude is expected within the state equilibrium. The system
appears to satisfy management, which is happy to pay attorneys to
churn litigation that rarely entails more substantial costs in terms
payment (probably in the form of a settlement) may follow where the injunction
against the deal is denied but the complaint is not dismissed. Id. at 1039.
329. Id. at 1023-39.
330. Id. at 1012-16.
331. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
332. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2001) (permitting opting out of
personal liability for directors for duty of care violations).
333. See In re Emerging Commc’n, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. Civ.A.
16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *38-40 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (holding outside but
financially sophisticated director jointly and severally liable with the corporate
principals for approving an unfair going private transaction).
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of money judgments or lost deals. Clearly the lawyers also are
satisfied. For the shareholders, the system remains problematic
even in the era of shareholder capitalism.
But it still is clearly superior to the pre-Cary system. In the
1970s, the Delaware courts decided that they would have to police in
order to maintain the state’s credibility as a national lawmaking
center. Police they have, but in a unique fashion. In the federal
state context, they have become the good cop to the federal
334
government’s bad cop.
Delaware’s courts try to avoid falling into
the conventional judicial role of enforcing positive law, even as the
federal government’s role as compliance officer expands and extends
deeper into state territory with mandates and prosecutions. This
distinguishes Delaware not only from the federal government, but
also from the other states, the judges of which cannot be expected to
play the game with such finesse.
Summing up, the Delaware courts responded to the instability,
criticism, and challenges of the 1970s with a new strategy that
merged fiduciary review with the self-regulatory governance
agenda. To look only at the case holdings is to see an unstable body
335
of law.
To look at the cases in the wider equilibrium context is to
see a stable strategy. The Delaware courts have learned that the
salient part of the case can be the remedy rather than the holding.
At the federal level, Delaware’s prominence as a governance and
dispute resolution center diminish its vulnerability to attack. With
Delaware now holding a prestigious place within elite governance
networks, federal agenda setters are unlikely to view it as a
problem. As its value increases in its customers’ eyes, Delaware will
have more than adequate political support in Washington. Thus did
Congress except Delaware from the SLUSA in 1998. The same did
not follow with SOX. But SOX addressed political demands that
334. The federal enforcement apparatus looms especially large in the context
of state-federal comparison.
Whether the actual enforcement numbers
impress—the SEC brings only 500 to 600 enforcement actions per year and
settles the vast majority, see Langevoort, supra note 288, at 6-7—depends on
the perspective of the observer; see also Bernard Black et al., Liability Risk for
Outside Directors: A Cross-Border Analysis, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 153 (2005)
(surveying Australia, Canada, Britain, the United States, France, Germany,
and Japan and showing that outside directors of public companies face only a
tiny risk of liability).
335. It has been suggested that Delaware cases’ indeterminacy stems from
strategic concerns and amounts to an abuse of the state’s dominant position in
the charter market. Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1919, 1927-28, 1931,
1935 (1998). We are unpersuaded. See William W. Bratton, Delaware Law as
Applied Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary and the Basic Course After Twenty-Five
Years, 34 GA. L. REV. 447, 469-72 (2000).
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Delaware’s evolutionarily stable strategy makes it powerless to
336
anticipate or confront. And, despite its entry into internal affairs,
SOX in no way impairs the charter market or Delaware’s rent flows.
A counterfactual suggestion arises. Delaware’s new respectability
assured that the Enron crisis worked itself out as a federal
enforcement event. No one suggested that state-level self-regulation
337
bore responsibility. Indeed, Delaware judges have taken to voicing
complaints about SOX and SEC governance initiatives in national
338
venues, extolling the virtues of their good-cop system. If they had
serious worries about federal intervention, they would not be
entering these public dissents.
B.

Takeovers and the Federal Threat

Now we backtrack to Delaware’s response to the instability
precipitated by the takeover wars of the 1980s. Six months after
339
CTS, thirty-four other states had enacted antitakeover legislation.
340
Management was pressuring Delaware to do the same.
However,
336. For a contrary view, see Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate
Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 654-62 (2004).
Professor Jones sees the Delaware courts making a belated, but still
preemptive, response to SOX in recent cases. We have no quarrels with her
description of the operative judicial behavior pattern. But, in our view, such
decisions amount to small-scale interventions that impact on corporate practice
in only marginal ways.
337. This point can be restated from an institutional perspective: federalstate relations are a function of socially constructed roles and institutional
roles; actors have mutable preferences that change due to socialization,
learning or persuasion.
MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENDA SETTING IN THE EU 57-59
(2003). Institutions are points of communicative interaction among actors
socialized within common norms. They discover their preferences through
processes of deliberation within these institutional frameworks. Kathleen R.
McNamara, Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic
of Delegation, 25 W. EUR. POL. 47, 66 (2002). Given deliberations about
corporate governance and compliance in the wake of an external shock,
Delaware’s new respectability makes it much less likely that actors at the
federal level will change their inherited preferences respecting the federal-state
allocation so as to disturb the state equilibrium.
338. See Former Del. Supreme Court Chief Justice: Federal Power Threatens
Role of Del. Law, 36 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1493 (2004) (describing a speech
by Norman Veasey at the ABA annual meeting); SEC Official, Delaware Chief
Justice Don’t See Eye-to-Eye on Federalism Issues, 36 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP.
1478 (2004) (describing back and forth between Chief Justice Myron Steele and
SEC Director of Corporation Finance Alan Beller at the ABA annual meeting).
339. See supra text accompanying notes 183-89.
340. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 625
(2003) (noting that Martin Lipton was recommending reincorporation out of
Delaware).
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actors in the Reagan administration were pressuring Delaware not
to do the same, threatening to preempt its takeover regulation if it
341
342
did.
Delaware finally enacted a weak statute.
Commentators
put contrasting glosses on these events. One view emphasizes that
Delaware’s weak response reflected shareholder-side demands
unique to the national chartering state. In other states the statutes
followed from the influence of local firms: all potential targets.
343
Delaware, in contrast, is home to bidders as well as targets, and
344
the countervailing capital market interest also registers there.
345
The other view emphasizes the federal threat.
Under this view,
the events of the era stand as an exemplar of constructive back and
forth within the federation, with threatened federal intervention
curbing Delaware’s structural preference for the management
interest.
Both perspectives figure into the overall picture. But we
emphasize a third aspect. Under Delaware’s evolutionarily stable
strategy, it sometimes has to make concessions to management in
the teeth of opposition at the national level. Even as Delaware
enacted a weak statute on a slow timetable, it did enact a statute.
Delaware thereby signaled its fidelity to the management interest
and a determination to maintain state law’s equilibrium tilt to
management. The federal threat imported credibility to the signal,
to the extent there really was a federal threat.
But the Washington actors who tried to protect the hostile
takeover in the 1980s lacked the political wherewithal to follow
through. As we have seen, the Congress was gridlocked on the
346
subject.
Moreover, even given congressional support for takeover
protection, it is not at all clear that federal intervention would have
disturbed the state equilibrium. The takeover protection legislation,
347
introduced in the House in 1987, would have given the SEC
authority to promulgate rules prohibiting defensive tactics and to
341. Id. at 626-27 (noting that the White House Counsel of Economic
Advisors opposed the Delaware statute, that an SEC Commissioner threatened
to preempt, and that SEC Chair David Ruder said the same in a speech and
also warned the statute’s drafter that enactment would be imprudent).
342. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 203 (2001).
343. Romano, supra note 108, at 468.
344. Id.
345. Roe, supra note 340, at 629-30; see also Bebchuk, supra note 119, at
1455; Cary, supra note 93, at 688-89; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of
Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1512 (1989). Anecdotal evidence
shows that Delaware lawmakers keep federal intervention in mind when they
take politically sensitive steps. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for
Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 906-08 (1990).
346. See supra text accompanying note 189.
347. H.R. 2172, 100th Cong. (1st Sess. 1987).
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create “standards for the fair conduct of contests for corporate
348
control,” subject to a shareholder “opt in” privilege. The provision
would have terminated Delaware’s takeover case law under Unocal
and Revlon, but otherwise would have left things in place. That
result might even have benefited Delaware by removing the
competitive threat posed by tighter antitakeover provisions enacted
in other states.
The greater threat already had passed, the threat posed in the
1970s by the cases that would have federalized much of fiduciary
349
law and the 1980 federal fiduciary standards bill.
But the 1980
bill ended the long series of federal chartering threats with more of
a whimper than a shot across Delaware’s bow. To look at the longer
history is to see federal chartering as a reform initiative that fell
lower and lower on legislative agendas as the twentieth century
350
unfolded. It lay at the top of the Taft administration’s agenda. It
dropped to the second tier of the second Roosevelt administration’s
351
agenda.
By the 1970s, it remained alive only in the offices of a
352
handful of Congress members.
After 1980, it disappeared. Even
as actors in the Reagan administration threatened to preempt
defensive tactics, they were committed to a cooperative federal-state
equilibrium and had no truck with federal chartering. By 2002
popular demands completed the transformation of federal corporate
politics. Now shareholder value triggers political emergencies.
None of this should be taken to deny the fact that Delaware’s
353
agents are averse to any exercise of federal preemptive power.
Moreover, federal rumblings certainly affected their behavior in the
mid-1970s and mid-1980s. But, similar rumblings have not been
heard since, even as Congress made a significant intervention in
SOX. But because the Enron crisis concerned compliance, the state
354
equilibrium gave Delaware no room for maneuver.
Federal chartering does remain in John Kingdon’s bottom

348. Id. § 14. The statute also imposed a one share one vote rule, id. § 3,
prohibited greenmail, id. § 5; accorded shareholders access to the proxy
statement to nominate directors, id. § 6; prohibited street sweeps, id. § 11,
prohibited golden parachutes, id. § 12; and amended the Williams Act in
numerous ways. Id. §§ 4, 7-10, 13.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 173-190.
350. See Brabner-Smith, supra note 49, at 162-63.
351. See supra text accompanying note 155.
352. See supra text accompanying note 173.
353. See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism
of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 953-60 (2003).
354. Congress in any event acted so quickly as to leave any window of
opportunity closed.
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drawer, ready to be revived if Delaware ever steps out of line. A
federal threat accordingly figures into Delaware’s strategy at a deep
structural level. To the extent it actively impacts Delaware’s play, it
presumably imports risk aversion respecting any state law
innovation that disrupts the equilibrium in management’s favor.
This shows in the historical pattern. The last time Delaware
initiated sua sponte a legislative process designed to catch
355
management’s eye by providing it new benefits was in the 1960s.
Significantly, deteriorating market share made Delaware feel
compelled to act. We also see such risk aversion in the historical
pattern that ties legislative innovation to rising stock markets.
Management-favorable innovation is less likely to raise eyebrows in
prosperous conditions. It follows that whatever the bottom is,
Delaware will not go there, just as it will never tilt markedly in the
shareholders favor. Finally, note that barriers to entry into the
charter market have imported stability since Delaware regained
market share after 1967. The barriers provide shareholders an
incidental systemic benefit even as they block the analogy to a firstbest product market. If entry were easy, the competitor could cater
to management, enervating the fiduciary regime or otherwise
curbing litigation.
C.

Delaware in the Era of Shareholder Capitalism

The shareholder interest only nominally lost the takeover wars
of the 1980s. Although legal innovations during the 1980s made
tender offers more expensive and less likely to occur, the normative
agenda of the hostile offerors and their proponents in policy
discussions did win the day. The offerors demanded shareholder
value maximization and the managers and state legislatures
resisted.
In the 1990s, management did an about-face and
356
assimilated the norm.
Incentivized by stock options, managers
began building their careers by maximizing value. Disinvestment
and conglomerate unbundling, which came by force in the 1980s,
became an ordinary business agenda item. At the same time,
institutional shareholders, outraged by the antitakeover triumph of
the 1980s, learned to ameliorate the shareholder collective action
problem by organizing and making their voice heard in boardrooms
357
and at the annual meetings. Performance pressures on executives

355. See supra note 65.
356. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1253, 1278-87 (1999).
357. Ironically, Delaware’s position is enhanced only because the primary
avenue for shareholder intervention—the proxy rules—already has been
federalized.
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intensified. So did conversations about items on the governance
agenda, leading to apparent improvements in practice.
Many question the depth of these changes now that the
shareholder-value era has given way to the Enron era. Whatever
the quality of the change in the practice, there can be no question
that the changes worked to Delaware’s advantage. The diffusion of
the shareholder-value norm and the shift of interest group influence
toward a more even balance between management and an emerging
358
class of shareholders, taken together, meant a better protected
shareholder interest. There resulted a lessening in intensity of the
ongoing debate over the separation of ownership and control. Where
thirty years ago there prevailed a managerialist model of corporate
governance that endorsed the delegation of substantial discretion to
359
managers,
today the absolutist view represents a minority
360
perspective.
The deflation of managerialism implies a
concomitant diminution of antimanagerialism.
As a result,
corporate governance debates have lost much of their ideological
coloration and corporate federalism has become depoliticized.
Today, debates tend to devolve on functional questions about value
creation and agency costs, a context in which Delaware often comes
up looking very good.
The federal threat accordingly recedes further into the deep
structure of corporate federalism. The state-enabling regime still
remains vulnerable to federal mandates, perhaps even more
vulnerable. Shareholder capitalism has brought the conduct of
business and stock market results forward in the national
361
consciousness,
making negative shocks politically salient in
Washington. Yet, despite the notable incursion on internal affairs
in SOX, it holds out no apparent disruption of the state equilibrium.
Delaware being a business, only a threat to the state equilibrium
matters to its bottom line. As to this, the federal government has
proved surprisingly cooperative.
Shareholder activism also helps Delaware by reducing the
threat of potential competition. Through much of the 1980s, it
remained conceivable that Delaware could suffer a significant
number of outbound reincorporations to the stronger antitakeover
states. To the extent shareholders rubber stamped shark-repellant

358. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 248, at 443.
359. See id. at 444.
360. Steve Bainbridge is the leading proponent. See, e.g., Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections,
55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 818 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 605 (2003).
361. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 71-95 (2000).
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charter amendments, they also would rubber stamp a managementprotective reincorporation. That assumption has not been safe for
362
some time. Shareholders now vote no on such proposals. It follows
that even as management retains agenda control over
reincorporation, the shareholder veto has become meaningful. The
exit door from Delaware to a neocharter monger would certainly be
363
sticky, and very well may be locked in most cases. And even if an
exit-seeking management could get the votes, it still might
hesitate—the reincorporation process might send a bad signal to the
financial markets. It follows that the only competitive threat to
Delaware would come from a state that devised a superior strategy
addressed to issues as to which management and shareholder
interests stand aligned. That seems an unlikely event, given
Delaware’s ability to learn and modify its approach in response to
changes in practice.
The foregoing points, taken together, also imply increased slack
for the Delaware courts respecting the ongoing mediation between
the management and shareholder interests. Widespread acceptance
of the shareholder-value norm frees the Delaware bench to
intervene for the shareholders with less worry about the result
disrupting the equilibrium. Such interventions have lost any public
interest coloration. In any event, the genius of Delaware lawmakers
lies in their ability to generate a thick fiduciary law without at the
same time imposing a significant compliance burden.
Hostile takeovers are the sticking point in this description.
Delaware remains an antitakeover state, with its poison pills,
classified boards, and cooperative judiciary more than making up for
the weakness of its antitakeover statute. Its continued adherence to
the management side and rejection of short-term value
maximization continues to occupy a top spot on the agendas of
364
shareholder activists and academic commentators.
But this appears to be another case of a narrow, elite political
network fighting a rearguard action against a stable equilibrium.

362. Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Value,
17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 87-88 (2001).
363. Here we note that a negative inference arises from Lucian Bebchuk et
al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1775, 1783 (2002), which surveys reincorporation activity to find that
competition does tend to reward the antitakeover states. But see Subramanian,
supra note 297, at 1843-44 (finding recapture antitakeover statutes and
mandatory classified boards have hurt the ability of adopting states to retain
companies).
364. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force
of Staggered Boards, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 950 (2002) (promoting effective
staggered boards as the most powerful antitakeover device).
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Takeovers have disappeared from the federal political agenda.
Between 1987 and 1990, thirty-two bills concerning hostile
365
takeovers and defensive tactics were introduced in the Congress.
Between 1991 and 1994, there were seven such bills, and after 1994,
366
only one.
With the Congress quiescent, the states’ antitakeover
equilibrium stays in place. This political result is easily explained.
Takeover protection never had much political traction in
Washington, due to management opposition and public indifference
367
or hostility. The newly vocal shareholder interest apparently still
makes for an insufficient counter. Nor is it clear that it would make
sense for the lead institutions to direct their political energies to
takeovers. Other governance matters, like committee practice and
access to the proxy statement, take precedence today.
Other structural factors also can be cited. Federal intervention
in internal affairs tends to follow stock market reverses, because
losses trigger political demands. Merger and acquisition activity,
including hostile offers, tends to coincide with rising stock
368
markets,
a time when the management interest registers
especially effectively.
Red ink may speak more loudly than
opportunity costs in any event. While the 1990s did yield clear-cut
cases of opportunity costs to shareholders due to tough management
369
defensive play, the cases were sporadic. The prevailing picture
370
was one of free-flowing premiums incident to friendly deals.
Hostile takeovers were politically salient during the 1980s, when
they provided the shareholder interest a stick to yield against
suboptimal earnings-retention practices and conglomerate
371
structures.
By the 1990s, norms and incentive structures had
shifted.
Managers in industries experiencing external shocks
voluntarily responded by entering into restructuring transactions
365. Memorandum from Elizabeth Glasgow, student research assistant, to
author, (August 2004) (on file with author).
366. Id.
367. See Romano, supra note 109, at 490-503.
368. Id.
369. Bebchuk et al., supra note 364, at 919-25.
370. WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE
688-89 (5th ed. 2003). Even as the absolute number of hostile offers stay
constant, see John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy:
How Contestable are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 855 (1999),
the percentage of overall activity involving a hostile bid dropped significantly,
from fourteen percent of all transactions in the 1980s to three percent in the
1990s. George Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J.
ECON. PERSP. 103, 104-09 (2001).
371. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and
Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J.
ECON. PERSP. 121, 127-32 (2001).
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Delaware as a National Agency
372

373

Several commentators, including us, have suggested that
corporate federalism be understood by analogy to the relationship
between the legislature and an administrative agency.
This
delegation analogy has attractive aspects. The spread of Delaware
charters nationwide makes Delaware a de facto national lawmaker.
As such it serves a harmonization function in the national
marketplace. It also can be noted that Delaware owes its national
impact to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution to
require states to admit firms chartered elsewhere, and accordingly
collects rents only as a result of a federal dispensation of grace. The
Congress has the authority to federalize the subject matter in any
event. It follows that even though the Congress never formally
delegated lawmaking authority to Delaware, it fairly may be viewed
as an arm of the national government. Arguably, to the extent the
analogy succeeds, the federal allocation is justified and with it
Delaware’s national role. We think that the analogy is descriptively
robust, but that it has limited justificatory impact for federalism
discussions.
Political theorists posit a menu of functions that agencies serve
for legislative principals. Two stand out as candidates for describing
Delaware. The first is substantive credibility. Sometimes the
legislature cannot credibly commit to stick to policy choices, due to
374
the vagaries of elective politics and constituent demands.
The
legislature delegates to an agent that can establish the desired
credible commitment and develop the necessary expertise. The
more insulated the agency from external political pressures the
better it serves this function. The delegation of monetary policy to a
375
central bank is the classic case. Extending the point to Delaware,
372. See Macey, supra note 196, 267-68 (using the agency analogy as the
basis for a public choice explanation of the existence of state regulation); Mark
J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2493, 2530-36 (2005) (comparing
Delaware to a central bank and noting limitations on the analogy).
373. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 122, at 1867-72 (drawing on
agency literature to suggest self-regulatory strategies).
374. See POLLACK, supra note 337, at 23-24. The legislature may want the
agency to take the blame for unpopular policies. See Morris P. Fiorina,
Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative
Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 55-58 (1982) (arguing that an administrative
solution often becomes the compromise accepted both by those fearing that a
legal solution might offer “too much” regulation and by those fearing that such
a solution might offer “too little” legislation). Macey draws on this literature in
his federal-state agency discussion but does not apply the analogy to corporate
law. See Macey, supra note 196, at 284-86.
375. See Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and
Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance, 2 EUR. UNION POL. 103, 110-11 (2001)
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we see a need for a credible commitment from government in order
to induce investment and can identify just that credible commitment
in Delaware’s evolutionarily stable strategy.
Does the analogy, thus drawn, carry through to import
presumptive immunity from federal interference in internal affairs?
We do not think so. The central bank analogy is descriptively
problematic because the delegation’s objective is the vesting of
376
political property rights in the agency.
Delaware has no such
rights and has steadily seen its regulatory turf contained. Worse,
we can go to back to the credibility concept and apply it to the SEC:
the SEC vests a voice for the shareholders and insulates the
mandatory disclosure system from compromise due to management
influence, importing credibility for the purpose of encouraging
investment. That the SEC was created in order to correct state-level
results bespeaks a state-level adverse selection problem.
At this point, the analogy’s proponent can fall back a step and
restate the point, addressing the system as modified by the federal
securities laws.
Like all principal-agent relationships, those
between legislatures and agencies implicate agency costs, and ex
377
post legislative overruling is a standard disciplinary device.
Congress did just this in enacting the securities laws. To the extent
that Delaware is easily overruled and a threat of additional
378
incursions imposes ongoing discipline in Delaware, the agency
379
analogy holds well.
It thereby comes to bear against those who
argue for total preemption. But, politically speaking, that argument
(discussing Kenneth Rogoff’s theory that governments tend to delegate
“monetary policy to a central banker who is more ‘conservative’ (i.e., more
inflation averse) than the government” and commenting on the high level of
independence bestowed upon the European Central Bank by the Maastricht
Treaty); see also Kenneth Rogoff, The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an
Intermediate Monetary Target, 100 Q. J. ECON. 1169, passim (1985).
376. Majone, supra note 375, at 114.
377. POLLACK, supra note 337, at 26-28.
378. See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or
Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade
Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 768-69 (1983) (discussing the “congressional
dominance” approach to principal-agent relations).
379. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC
DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 79-81, 85-92 (1998),
which evaluates the success of a delegation in terms of two factors—knowledge
and incentives: if the principal either knows what the agent is doing, or the
agent’s action makes the principal better off than would the status quo.
Delaware is transparent, making oversight easy; often Delaware’s actions make
the federation better off. Lupia and McCubbins offer a tougher standard in the
alternative. Id. at 91-92. Under this the delegation succeeds only when the
agent takes action that improves the principal’s welfare. Viewed this way, the
Delaware delegation fails in some instances.
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has fallen off the agenda. Today’s federalism discussion concerns
the magnitude of the presumption against nonintervention. At this
point, the agency analogy works against charter market advocates
who argue for a strong restraint against federal incursions into
internal affairs.
Delegation analysis legitimizes such federal
incursions on the ground that the principal’s preferences should
prevail. We are left to judge the federal intervention in cost-benefit
terms, with no special presumption skewing the analysis, at least so
long as the intervention does not disrupt the state-level
380
equilibrium, a result that federal authorities do not appear to
prefer.
Now, let us try a second line of political theory. Under this
scenario, the agency serves a function analogous to that of a
381
congressional committee: it sets the agenda, avoiding cycling, and
382
perhaps also skewing the agenda in a desired direction. Mark Roe
draws this analogy forcefully, pointing out that the delegation to
Delaware orders the agenda and limits the players to the
management and shareholder interests, relegating public interest
383
advocates to secondary influence at the federal level.
This too is
descriptively accurate. But its justificatory impact on the federalism
discussion is similarly narrow. It provides an argument against
total preemption, but it does not, for example, support an argument
against federal intervention to preempt antitakeover legislation or
invalidate corporate defensive devices. We also would add a
historical caveat. The description works better and better as one
goes back in time, and federal chartering motivated by a public
interest agenda becomes an active agenda item under the trust
paradigm. As one moves forward in time, the overall federal
regulatory scheme more and more instantiates the strategy of
contract and outside regulation for outside constituents and the
public interest, with federal corporate law politics becoming more
shareholder-value oriented. To the extent federal corporate politics
focuses only on the governance agenda, and it has been thus focused
for twenty-five years, the structural importance of agenda control at
the state level matters less and less for shareholder capitalism.

380. At this point the proponent of state discretion can argue that Delaware
should be insulated as if it were a central bank. But now the description has
failed and the point merely restates the normative claim made in the federalism
discussion.
381. See D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF
DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 22-25
(1991).
382. POLLACK, supra note 337, at 25.
383. Roe, supra note 372, at 2504-19.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Federal intervention that interferes with the state equilibrium
could be justified if done for the purpose of encouraging keener
charter competition and a more even-handed strategic balance
between the shareholder and management interests. But we
perceive no political incentives that might encourage federal
micromanagement of the charter market. Failing that, corporate
federalism remains robust, so long as the federal government and
stock exchanges continue to refrain from allocating to themselves so
much subject matter as to cause Delaware’s customers to question
the efficacy of their rent payments. Those who would prefer to see
no further expansion of federal territory are likely to be frustrated.
The shareholder class having risen, corporate law is hardwired into
national politics. Only two developments could change the pattern:
either managers assimilate a strong norm of financial truth-telling
and compliance with law, or shareholders assimilate the precepts of
fundamental value investment. We predict no change.
Meanwhile, Delaware is safe in the present context. It would
take a dramatic shift in federal policy preferences to threaten it.
Such a development seems unlikely. We have seen striking changes
in political preferences since 1888, yet these have given rise to few,
if any, serious attempts to transfer corporate lawmaking in whole to
the federal government. Positive political economy suggests that
once an institutional structure has run in one direction for a long
period, one is unlikely to see new constraints that alter the original
384
understanding.

384. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.

